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LOCAL RULES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS: USURPATION, LEGISLATION, OR
INFORMATION?
By
Steven Flanders*
A fundamental policy choice concerning the way federal courts
shall run themselves is contained in the seemingly innocuous language
of rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges
thereof may from time to time make and amend rules gov-
erning its practice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of
rules and amendments so made by any district court shall
upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court
of the United States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the
district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules.'
The first and third sentences of the rule provide two powers that are
distinct, though related. The first sentence is self-explanatory. Each
district court is empowered to promulgate local rules as it deems neces-
sary, with the limitation that its rules be consistent with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.2 The third and final sentence of the rule in-
* Circuit Executive, United States Courts, Second Circuit; formerly Project Director,
Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C.; Ph.D. 1970, Indiana University, Political Sci-
ence; B.A. 1963, Haverford College.
Among many people who have helped substantially in the preparation of this paper, the
author would like to thank research assistants Barry Groce, Clyde Long, and Jane Nishida,
as well as Professor Thomas Krattenmaker of Georgetown University Law Center. How-
ever, neither these people nor the author's employers during the preparation of this article
bear responsibility for any errors in the information or the views expressed herein.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 83. Rule 83 has not been amended since it became effective in 1938.
See note 285 infra, for a discussion of the sparse "legislative history." See also notes 170 &
171 infra.
2. See Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rule Making Procedures, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 905 (1976); J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULEMAKING PROCEDURES chs. 1, 11 &
V (1977) [hereinafter cited as WEmNsTEIN]. The first sentence of rule 83 restates an inherent
power that already had been restated in 28 U.S.C. § 2071, which grants all courts established
by act of Congress the powers to prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. See note
39 infra. Analogous rules are FED. R. CIuM. P. 57, FED. R. ApP. P. 47, and former GEN.
ADMIRALTY R. 44 (rescinded July 1, 1966).
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troduces what has come to be known as the "decision-making power."'3
Where guidance is not forthcoming in federal rules or statutes, the
court may act as it deems desirable and appropriate, without regard to
state statute or practice. The rulemakers of the 1930's attached great
importance to this latter provision. For example, Edgar B. Tolman,
Secretary of the Advisory Committee, remarked:
That provision is, in my opinion, one of the most important
and salutary in the entire set of rules. It closes all gaps in the
rules. It puts an end to the whole of the Conformity Act and
it permits judges to decide the unusual or minor procedural
problems that arise in any system of jurisprudence in light of
the circumstances that surround them.4
Most federal district courts have promulgated local rules in con-
siderable numbers, often using them to provide detailed instructions
concerning many aspects of their practice and the practice of law
before them. Nevertheless, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
became effective in 1938, there has been a remarkable difference of
opinion between practitioners and legal scholars about the courts' exer-
cise of the choice rule 83 provides. Among practitioners, the flourish-
ing of local rules has apparently occasioned little objection.5 When
federal judges meet to discuss procedural alternatives, local rules are
3. Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1251, 1252 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]. Other critical commentary on local rules, referred to
throughout this article, draws heavily on this distinction. Although the Columbia Note au-
thors were not the first to distinguish the rulemaking power from the decision-making power
in rule 83, the distinction might have been forgotten had they not highlighted it. See text
accompanying note 49 infra.
4. ABA INsTrurtE ON FEDERAL RULES 129 (Wash., D.C. 1938) [hereinafter cited as
ABA INsTrirTE (Wash., D.C.)]. During the summer and fall of 1938, three "Institutes" on
the new rules were held under the auspices of the American Bar Association in Cleveland,
Washington, and New York. Participants included most members of the original Advisory
Committee, who made addresses and responded to questions about the rules. Major Tol-
man, of the Illinois Bar, was editor-in-chief of the AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL.
5. In several recent instances, lawyer committees have been established to propose a
complete revision of local rules in one or more districts. None of these committees has
proposed a significant reduction in the number or scope of local rules. For example, in 1977,
a statewide committee was established in the two districts in Arkansas to propose local rules
common to both districts. No judge or other employee of either court was on the committee,
and the chief judge emphasized that the committee had an entirely free rein. The proposed
rules completely revised their outdated predecessors and are far broader in scope. A similar
exercise in the Northern District of California led to adoption on August 1, 1977, of new
rules comparable in scope to the older ones. The work of an Iowa statewide committee is
described in Blair, The New Local Rulesfor Federal Practice in lo wa, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 517
(1974). A committee for the Ninth Circuit has proposed uniform local rules for possible
adoption by all district courts on many of the topics covered by present rules. E. Cleary &
R. Misner, Preliminary Report: Uniform Local Rules For United States District Courts of
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often the language they use.6 Proposals are framed and exchanged in
this form and great importance is attached to developing effective
rules.7 In one commentator's view, "[o]ne of the first steps a concerned
court should undertake is to devise up-to-date local rules that address
the current problems the court faces and provide procedures for deal-
ing with them."'
On the other hand, among scholars the commentary on court
rulemaking has been almost uniformly critical.9 Professor Charles
Alan Wright believes that the "[u]se by lower courts of their rulemak-
ing power. . . is for the most part an unmitigated disaster."'" Else-
where, in what he has described as "the more restrained language
appropriate for a treatise,"'" Professor Wright has provided detailed
views on the subject. Referring to "[t]he flood of local rules on impor-
tant and controversial subjects," Professors Wright and Miller advocate
imposing restrictions upon the courts' rulemaking powers:
Unfortunately many of the products of this well-intentioned
effort are either invalid on their face or intrude unwisely into
areas that should be dealt with on a national basis by rules
made by the Supreme Court. The great goals of a simple,
flexible, and uniform procedure in federal courts throughout
the nation will be seriously compromised unless an effective
check is put on the power to make local rules. This might be
done either by amending Civil Rule 83, and its counterparts
in the Criminal and Appellate Rules, to specify those few lim-
ited areas in which local rules may be made or by requiring
the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 2, 1979) (unpublished draft). Professors Cleary and Misner have
served as reporters to the committee. See Appendix B infra.
For one practicing lawyer's broadside attack on local rules, see Caballero, Is There an
Over-Exercise of Local Rule-Making Powers by the United States District Courts? 24 FED. B.
NEws 325 (Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Caballero, Over-Exercise] and Proceedings of a
Session of the Conference 0/Metropolitan District Chief Judges on Rules and Rule Making, 79
F.R.D. 471, 484-91 (1978) (remarks of Mr. Caballero) [hereinafter cited as Conference on
Rule Making]. See also, Kahn, Local Pretrial Rules in Federal Courts, 6 LITIGATION, Spring
1980 at 34 [hereinafter cited as Kahn]. A committee of the American College of Trial Law-
yers is beginning a study of local rules from a generally critical perspective.
6. For references to local rules and related forms, see SEMINARS FOR NEWLY AP-
POINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES, 1970-1971 (West) [hereinafter cited as SEMI-
NARS].
7. Grady, Trial Lawyers, Litigators, and Clients' Costs, 4 LITIGATION, Spring 1978 at 5.
8. Schwarzer, Beating the Trial Court Paper Chase, 5 LITIGATION, Spring 1979 at 5.
9. See, e.g., note 91 infra.
10. Wright, Book Review, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 652, 657 (1978) (WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF
COURT RULEMAKING PROCEDURES).
11. Id
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approval of local rules, perhaps by the Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure or its parent body, the
Judicial Conference of the United States, before they may go
into effect. 12
Some years ago Professor Maurice Rosenberg, now Assistant Attorney
General for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, character-
ized federal courts as a "procedural Tower of Babel" because of the
differences between local rules. He recommended reform of local rules
as a top priority for the new Federal Judicial Center, then under con-
sideration. 3
How are we to account for this chasm that separates the practition-
ers from the commentators? Have the courts simply been irresponsible
in their exercise of the rulemaking power, as the commentators suggest?
The purpose of this article is to analyze the district courts' exercise of
their power to make local rules and to demonstrate that the courts' ac-
tions have been, more often than not, well-reasoned and beneficial.
While there have been occasional abuses, the sum total of errors ap-
pears to be slight and their effects insignificant, particularly in relation
to the advantages the local rules offer.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSING LOCAL RULES
The exercise of local rule power and the resulting proliferation of
local rules have been characterized in essentially three ways. Some
critics consider it a usurpation of powers that properly belong to the
Supreme Court and Congress. Other critics believe the exercise of the
rulemaking power represents impermissible legislation by the courts.
Yet others view it as serving a useful informational purpose that could
not effectively be accomplished by any other means. This divergence
12. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152, at 223
(1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. But see Conference on
Rule Making, supra note 5, at 491. For critical commentary, see WEINSTEIN, suora note 2,
at ch. 5; Columbia Note, supra note 3; Caballero, Over-exercise, supra note 5; Comment, The
Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-Ad Survey, 1966 DuKE L.J.
1011 [hereinafter cited as Local Rules Survey]. See also Cohn, Federal Discovery, A Survey
of Local Rules and Practices in View of Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L.
REv. 253 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cohn]. For a defense of the courts' exercise of the
rulemaking power, see Flanders, In Praise of Local Rules, 62 JUn. 28 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Flanders, In Praise].
13. Hearings on S. 915 and H. A 6111 before the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 282 (1967). The "Tower of Babel" characteriza-
tion has been widely and erroneously ascribed to a different hearing where this language
does not appear.
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in the views of the operation of local rules can be traced to the premises
from which one approaches the exercise of local rule power.
Wright and Miller criticize local rules practice because, in their
view, the federal trial courts have effectively usurped powers of the
Supreme Court and Congress that properly are delegated only to the
Judicial Conference of the United States through the conference rules
committees. 14 Contrary to the purposes of the rules" and contrary to
the standard established in Miner v. Atlass, 16 which stated that district
courts cannot institute "basic procedural innovations" under the guise
of local rules,17 the local courts have arrogated to themselves powers
not delegated to them. Pursuant to their rulemaking power, the courts
have introduced limitations on the number of interrogatories that may
be served, 8 have made anachronistic references to the old conformity
principle,1 9 and have regulated endless minor matters of procedural de-
tail. In Wright and Miller's view, "[1]ocal rules, which were expected to
be few in number and to cover noncontroversial housekeeping matters,
now are extremely numerous and cover a great variety of subject mat-
ter."
20
Wright and Miller further remark that "[m]any local rules have
been held invalid. . . . Many other local rules that seem in direct
conflict with the general rules remain on the books."' 21 An early treat-
ment of local rules, relied upon by Wright and Miller, argues that "[i]t
is peculiarly difficult to bring the issue of a local rule's validity before
an appellate court."22 These critics argue, in essence, that the district
courts have exercised a power assigned to them neither by the Rules
14. See generally 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at § 3152; WEIsTEiN, supra
note 2.
15. See Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1253-59 for an argument that the local rules
were intended to be few and narrow. For a counterargument, see note 285 infra.
16. 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
17. Id at 650.
18. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at § 2168 (Supp. 1980). See text accompanying
notes 119-29 infra.
19. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 244. See text accompanying notes 81-90
infra.
20. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 228 (footnote omitted). See generally Local
Rules Survey, supra note 12.
21. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 219.
22. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1263. Another commentator observes, "[i]n most
instances the finality rule, limiting appeals from non-dispositive orders, prevents intermedi-
ate appeals challenging local rules. Moreover, local bar associations as well as attorneys
have been reluctant to cross swords with local judges by challenging their rules in litigation."
WEinsTEiN, supra note 2, at 121 (footnote omitted).
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Enabling Act' nor any other source, and have exercised this power
largely unchecked because the appellate process has proven peculiarly
inadequate to deal with this supervisory task.
The criticism that the district courts exercise impermissible legisla-
tive power has focused on the procedure by which local rules are
adopted. Judge Weinstein argues that the making of court rules is to be
understood through reference to theories of legislation and legislative
delegation.24 This argument leads Judge Weinstein to conclude that
publication and debate are desirable before adoption of local rules.2-
At the district level, as at the national level, he advocates requiring
notice, hearings, and an opportunity to be heard on proposed rules.
His belief, which is widely shared by other critics of the process, 26 is
that local rules have usually been developed with minimal consultation
and often represent the whims and idiosyncrasies of temporary majori-
ties of judges.
By focusing on what they perceive as usurpation or legislation,
these critics have largely ignored the practical utility of local rules. For
example, the local rule device serves essential informational purposes
that are consistent with most critics' conception of its proper limits. At
the most mundane level, the local rules serve as a kind of national no-
tice board, informing lawyers of unexceptionable details of a court's
operation. From local rules, lawyers learn in which division they
should file a suit,27 and what regulations govern access to court files
and exhibits.28
More important, local rules have been essential tools in imple-
menting court policy in administrative matters. Courts differ from
most organizations in that they must rely heavily on outsiders, espe-
cially members of the bar, in their operation.29 Particularly in matters
affecting the management of case flow, the policies of the court directly
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1979).
24. See WErNSTFIN, supra note 2, at 89-96.
25. Id at 128-29.
26. See, eg., 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 220. See text accompanying notes
223-25 infra.
27. See, e.g., S.D. FLA. R. 1. There is no other source for this information. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 81-131 define the boundaries of the districts, and of any divisions of each district, but
offer no information about the clerk's office service county by county. In addition, some
divisions have been created by local rule. See Appendix A, and notes 255-57 infra and
accompanying text.
28. See, eg., N.D. ALA. R. 6.
29. See H. JACOB & J. EISENSTEiN, FELONY JUSTICE (1977). Judge Hubert L. Will
places counsel immediately after the judge in listing "the available work or production force
in court cases." SEMINARS, supra note 6, at 15.
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involve the lawyers who practice before it.3" When a district court
adopts a procedure to implement Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
on pretrial practice,31 the result can only be effective if lawyers know
what is expected of them and why. The same is true for many other
areas of the policy and practice involved in running the complex opera-
tion of a federal trial court. Matters such as determining the balance
between "free press" and "fair trial" concerns,32 dismissing cases for
failure to prosecute33 and interrogating jurors after verdict3 4 all involve
regulation of the conduct of lawyers, and are clearly within a court's
discretion.
Local rules provide a third important informational function be-
cause they alert rulemakers to the need for changes in national rules
and provide an empirical basis for making changes. District court ef-
forts to develop policies for effectuating national rules may fail, sug-
gesting that the national rule is incomplete, inadequate or leads to
unanticipated conflicts with other rules, statutes, or the Constitution.
Alternatively, district court policies may succeed, and a formulation
embodied in a local rule may commend itself to the national
rulemakers. This source of information on procedural developments is
only gradually gaining recognition, though precursors can be identi-
fied. 35
Usurpation, legislation, and information have all been a part of
the local rules experience. The task now is to determine what balance
has been struck among the three. Our notion of the proper procedure
to be used in drafting and promulgating local rules turns on a determi-
nation of the proper role of local rules in the judicial function.
30. See generally S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1977) [hereinafter cited as CASE
MANAGEMENT]; Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 147 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Flanders].
31. See text accompanying notes 167-75 infra, on local rules to implement rule 16.
32. See text accompanying notes 176-89 infra.
33. See note 194 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 68-76 infra.
35. Judge Weinstein recently said,
I think it is useful to have local rules supplementing national rules and statutes.
The issue parallels that of federalism in the broadest sense .... The advantage of
our federal system and of the practice of permitting local rules is that they en-
courage initiative and imaginative development of new ideas in a variety of differ-
ent settings. Local rules can act as "laboratories," much as the states do.
Letter to the author (Mar. 29, 1978). See also, WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 136. The Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules is now making active use of local rules in its own agenda and
in occasional proposals for innovation by local rule. See, e.g., ProposedAmendment to Fed
AR Ci. P. 33, 77 F.R.D. 613, 645 (1978).
1981]
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If local rulemaking is indeed the final step in legislative delegation
under the Rules Enabling Act, it follows that the courts should adopt
corresponding procedures, including not only notice and hearings but
also fact-gathering, perhaps by permanent staff. Under this conception
we might begin to question the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court majority in Miner36 that forbids "basic procedural innovations,"
and consider the more expansive approach of the Miner dissent37 and
apparently of the Court in Colgrove v. Battin.38 Under this approach
we might wish to expand use of the local rules as a proving ground for
significant procedural change to aid national rulemakers.
If, on the other hand, local rulemaking is understood as a tool for
trial courts to use in governing themselves under their inherent pow-
ers,39 as well as under the express authorities for local rules, then it may
follow that the subject matter of local rules should be relatively limited
and the adoption process simple. Consultation and fact-gathering
could be undertaken only to the extent the court found useful. Finally,
perhaps there is a distinct "notice board" function that can be clearly
distinguished from local rulemaking, so that purely informational mat-
ters could be reserved to a separate document.
The purpose of this article is to outline a local rules policy consis-
tent with the history of rule 83, and based on an assessment of the use
and abuse of the local rules device. In order to achieve this, it is neces-
sary to consider previous experiences with local rules. The first step
requires examining the assertion that the device has been abused, by
detailing every available instance in which a local rule has been ques-
tioned. The next step will be to describe and assess the procedures em-
ployed for drafting and promulgating local rules. The third step
involves surveying the scope, use, and purposes of local rules.
II. A SEARCH FOR SIGNIFICANT ABUSES
In order to show that the makers of local rules have unwisely
36. 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960).
37. Id at 660, 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Miner dissent would uphold the local rule
regulating procedure under General Admiralty Rule 44, because local rules provide an op-
portunity for input by the district court, the most apt body to deal with specific problems).
38. 413 U.S. 149 (1973). In Colgrove, the Court upheld District of Montana Rule 13(d),
which provides for six person juries in civil cases. The Court determined that this rule did
not violate the seventh amendment, or 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which states that the right to a jury
shall be retained as at common law. The Court also found that the rule was not inconsistent
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83.
39. See United States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Md. 1977); Levin & Amster-
dam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule Making: 4 Problem in Constitutional Revision,
107 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1, 30-32 (1958). See also note 213 infra.
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usurped powers belonging to the Supreme Court or Congress, it would
be necessary to show that local rulemaking power has been commonly
abused. Abuses certainly exist, and can be found in many forms.
Some of them merely involve areas in which the court already has
broad discretion, so a local rule merely imposes a uniform, albeit some-
times arbitrary rule.4' Other claimed abuses turn out to be inconse-
quential, moot, or meaningless upon analysis.4 1 Still other abuses pose
significant problems that may require resolution at the national level.42
A. Court Discretion
Several local rules have been attacked as substituting rulemaking
for adjudication, "to escape from the arduous but essential task of case-
by-case analysis." 43 Among these are local rules that set the amount of
a supersedeas bond, require cost bonds, establish a discovery cutoff
date, prohibit interrogation of jurors, and allocate payment of discov-
ery expenses.
1. Supersedeas bond
The common local rule indicating the usual amount for a superse-
deas bond is useful for examining the notion that rulemaking avoids
case-by-case analysis.44 A typical rule, from the District Court of
40. See text accompanying notes 43-90 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 91-111 infra.
42. See text accompanying notes 112-229 infra.
43. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1252.
44. FFD. R. Civ. P. 62(d) provides:
When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may
obtain a stay subject to the exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of this rule. The
bond may be given at or after the time of filing the notice of appeal or of procuring
the order allowing the appeal, as the case may be. The stay is effective when the
supersedeas bond is approved by the court.
The provisions of subparagraph (a) do not allow a stay as a matter of right in cases involving
injunctions, receiverships, or patent infringements where an accounting has been ordered.
Only where there has been a money judgment can a stay be obtained as a matter of right,
and only where the court has approved the security posted by appellant.
Prior to July 1, 1968, when the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were promul-
gated, rule 73(d) specifically stated the requirements for an "acceptable" supersedeas bond.
Rule 73(d) provided that the "amount of the bond shall be fixed at such sum as will cover
the whole amount of the judgment remaining unsatisfied, costs on appeal, interest, [and]
damages for delay." Rule 73(d), however, also provided that the court could affix a different
amount for the bond or order security other than the bond if the circumstances so war-
ranted.
The purpose of requiring a supersedeas bond is to protect the claim of the successful
party, in case a judgment debtor moved to make himself "judgment proof' while pursuing
an appeal. The desire to protect the interests of the claimant is not absolute, however. It has
been held that the judgment debtor should not be made to endure irreparable harm merely
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Rhode Island, reads:
A supersedeas bond staying execution of a money judgment
shall be in the amount of the judgment plus 10% of the
amount to cover interest and any award of damages for delay
plus $250 to cover costs, unless the court directs otherwise.45
Eight other districts have comparable provisions. Only one of
these, rule 28 of the Northern District of Illinois, differs in the impor-
tant respect that there is no express provision for court discretion.
Otherwise the provisions are essentially similar to the Rhode Island
rule except for variation in the amount required to cover interest.4 6 Re-
ferring to the Rhode Island rule and to two others, Wright and Miller
say, "[t]his is an unfortunate provision. The appellate rules deliber-
ately say nothing on the size of a supersedeas bond because they in-
tended that this should be fixed individually by the court in each
case."
47
This objection has no force unless applied only to the Northern
District of Illinois rule. The Rhode Island language informs lawyers of
to satisfy the requirements of a hard and fast rule on the amount of bond. See C. Albert
Sauter Co. v. Richard S. Sauter Co., 368 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In such cases, the
interests of the claimant must be balanced with the desire to prevent irreparable harm to the
appellant, who may be successful on appeal.
A balancing of interests was necessary in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 314 F.
Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Hughes, appealing an antitrust judgment in the amount of
$145,448,141.00, was required under local rule 33 of the Southern District of New York to
post a bond in the amount of judgment plus 11%. Hughes maintained that compliance was
impracticable because the sureties contacted would provide a bond of this size only upon
deposit of collateral, in cash or government bonds, for the full amount of the bond. The trial
judge felt that it was within his inherent power to reduce and modify the bond requirement.
Id at 96. This discretion is now explicit in the current version of local rule 33.
What should be the amount of a supersedeas bond? Professor Moore believes that the
provisions of former rule 73(d) requiring the amount of the judgment plus interest and costs
should be used as the guide in all but extraordinary cases. 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
208.06[2] (2d ed. 1980). Moore states that rule 73(d) was merely the codification of early
Supreme Court opinions on the subject and thus should be instructive, even though the rule
has been abrogated. See Catlett v. Brodie, 22 U.S. 553 (1824) and Jerome v. McCarter, 88
U.S. 17 (1874). However, the fact that the explicit language of rule 73(d) was not retained in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(b) suggests that the Advisory Committee on Appel-
late Rules felt that the amount of the bond was best left to the discretion of the district court,
Local rules on supersedeas bonds generally conform to former rule 73(d). See note 46 infra.
45. D.R.I. R. 37.
46. Local rules D. MASS. R. 31 and D.N.H. R. 28, specify 10% to cover interest. Local
rules N.D. ILL. R. 28, N.D.N.Y. R. 29, S.D.N.Y. R. 33, and W.D.N.Y. R. 29 all specify 11%
for interest. Local rules E.D. LA. R. 6.6 and N.D. T~x. R. 12.4 specify 20% for interest. All
specify $250 for costs, a figure that must be unrealistic today in almost all cases. Since there
is no current and reliable source for local rules, this enumeration and others in this article
may not be complete. See note 230 infra.
47. 12 WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 12, at 242.
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the court's normal requirement and puts them on notice that they
should be prepared to show exceptional circumstances if they believe a
different amount is appropriate. To the extent that the provision nar-
rows the court's broad discretion to fix the amount individually in each
case, it probably achieves a desirable result.
It would be interesting to know precisely how the practice differs
in courts that have this provision from the practice in those that do not.
There are several possibilities, but for all of them it seems useful to
have a local rule. Probably we can assume that Rhode Island and the
other districts with such a rule set most of the bonds at the level speci-
fied, with most of the exceptions at a lower figure. Possibly the other
courts have a similar pattern, following past practice based on former
rule 73(d). Suppose, then, that the practice is identical in local rule and
non-local rule courts. In that case, it seems clear that a useful purpose
is served by informing the bar that exercise of the court's discretion on
this point normally leads to a single, predictable result.
Alternatively, suppose the practice is more varied, as Wright and
Miller presumably prefer. If the court acts randomly and treats similar
cases differently, the result is undesirable. In this situation, a court
would do well to adopt and publicize a uniform policy, by rule or
otherwise. The harder case would be the hypothetical court that arrives
at a subtle and yet precise standard for setting a bond that permitted
determination in each instance of the characteristics of the case and led
to a result tailored to the case, which would be reached each time a
bond was set in a similar case. What sort of information flow would
support this achievement? There is relatively little law on bond
amounts, and what little there is deals with clearly exceptional cases to
which the local rule specification presumably would not apply.48 Un-
less it has unpublished or secret standards, our hypothetical court must
draw upon the experience, past practice, and sense of fairness of each
judge in consultation with counsel.
Two observations seem clear. First, in a mechanical and repetitive
matter such as this, it is undesirable to approach each decision as
though the case at hand were unique and could be "adjudicated" only
after an appraisal of its special characteristics, in light of past action
and experience. Lawyers and judges have far better ways to spend
their time and money. Second, such a process would probably not
achieve our hypothesized goal of setting bonds that vary in fair and
predictable ways. A likely outcome would be bond "disparity" reflect-
48. See note 45 supra.
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ing the idiosyncrasies of individual judges and the lawyers they have
worked with on this point.
In sum, it is difficult to imagine how a court could function with
no bond rule and serve litigants better than if it had a rule or other
articulation of its policy. On this matter, as on most local rules matters,
if articulable standards exist, it is best not to hide them.49 If they do not
exist, disparate treatment will occur unless the court undertakes the
burden of exhaustive investigation and consultation each time a bond
is set. Substantial disparity would probably survive even this improba-
ble exercise. Of course, any rule promulgated should contain the al-
lowance for court discretion provided in the Rhode Island rule. Rules
that omit this provision are possibly questionable.5
2. Cost bonds
Local rules that require security for costs present a somewhat simi-
lar issue, but these rules have been attacked on constitutional and other
grounds as well. The principal problem that local rules have attempted
to address is the foreign plaintiff coming into a jurisdiction with a frivo-
lous claim, bringing suit, and then leaving the jurisdiction before judg-
ment is entered. When this occurs and the plaintiff loses, the court may
lack jurisdiction to recover costs. Local rules seek to forestall this result
by requiring foreign and sometimes other plaintiffs to post security for
costs with the court.
Case law on this subject is sparse. The leading cases are Farmer v.
Arabian American Oil Co. ,51 Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante,52
and Kreitzer v. Puerto Rico Cars, Inc. 53 In Farmer, the plaintiff's case
was dismissed when he failed to post a $6000 bond pursuant to the
court's order under rule 2(a) of both the Southern and Eastern Districts
of New York. On appeal from the dismissal, the plaintiff challenged
49. The Columbia Note authors grant the merit of this approach in connection with one
minor matter, while attacking local rules on supersedeas bonds and similar matters for sub-
stituting formula for reasoned decisions. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 126. The
Supreme Court made a strong argument for articulated standards by local rule in the area of
time limits in Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1960). See also In re Petrol Shipping
Corp., 360 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
50. On the other hand, a court's inherent powers, plus the admonition in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure I that the rules are to be construed to secure the just disposition of every
action, are probably adequate to remedy the omission. The difference between the Northern
Illinois and Rhode Island rules is primarily one of appearance and attitude only, as the court
points out in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 314 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
51. 285 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1960).
52. 535 F.2d 140 (Ist Cir. 1976).
53. 417 F. Supp. 498 (D.P.R. 1975).
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rule 2(a) as being outside the authority conferred by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 83. At the time, rule 2(a) read:
a plaintiff, who is not a resident of the State of New York,
shall file within twenty days after service upon him of a de-
mand therefor, a bond for costs in the sum of $250.00, unless
the court, on motion and for cause shown, dispenses with the
bond or fixes a different amount.
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the require-
ment of a $6000 bond as security for costs was an abuse of the trial
court's discretion that effectively denied the plaintiff his day in court. 4
While the court in Farmer questioned the validity of rule 2(a)'s fixed
requirement that a bond of $250 be posted by all nonresident plaintiffs,
it did not invalidate the rule.5 Rather, the court reversed what it con-
sidered to be an abuse of discretion by the court.
In Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante,56 the court considered
the validity of rule 5 of the District Court of Puerto Rico. Rule 5 pro-
vided in relevant part:
When the plaintiff is domiciled outside of Puerto Rico or
is a foreign corporation, a bond shall be required to secure the
costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees which may be awarded.
All proceedings in the action shall be stayed until bond is
given, which shall not be less than five hundred dollars
($500.00). The court may require an additional bond upon a
showing that the original bond is not sufficient security ....
This rule shall be liberally interpreted in favor of the
plaintiff so as not to preclude his right to sue through exces-
sive bond requirement. Consistent with this, the Court, for
good cause shown, may dispense with this requirement.
The appellant in Hawes challenged the order for the bond, alleging
that rule 5 contravened the policy of securing an inexpensive determi-
nation of every action as expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1, placed a limitation on venue in violation of the constitutional princi-
ple of equal protection, and obstructed the plaintiff's right to travel in-
terstate in violation of the privileges and immunities clause. The court
held that rule 5 did not violate the policy or letter of the federal rules
because it is to be "liberally construed" so as not to preclude the plain-
54. 285 F.2d at 721.
55. The case has been wrongly cited as though it did invalidate the rule in 12 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 12, at 231-32.
56. 535 F.2d 140 (lst Cir. 1976).
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tifrs right to sue.57 The court also found that the appellant's constitu-
tional claims were without merit, because the distinction rule 5 draws
between resident and non-resident plaintiffs is rationally related to the
end of enforcing an award for costs against a non-resident who may be
out of the court's jurisdiction at the time ofjudgment5 8 A district court
reached a similar conclusion in Kreitzer v. Puerto Rico Cars, Inc. , in
ruling on a similar attack on a revised version of the same rule.
While upholding the validity of rule 5, the court in Hawes was
careful to point out that "the district court is under an obligation to
evaluate each case individually, and to exercise its inherent discretion
to apply the requirements of rule 5 so as to facilitate a just and speedy
determination on the merits as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.1160 Fur-
ther, the court pointed out that "'to require all foreign plaintiffs, as
such, to post substantial security as a condition to access to the courts
may well be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.' ",61
As was true of supersedeas bonds, local rules concerning security
for costs only conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
Constitution if they preclude the use of judicial discretion.62 The great
majority of local rules on this matter do provide for the use of judicial
discretion in determining if a bond is necessary. Some rules, however,
impose the requirement of a bond as a matter of course and allow for
reduction or elimination of the bond only for good cause shown by the
plaintiff. A few rules do not explicitly provide for the use of discretion,
at least insofar as eliminating the requirement for a bond is con-
cerned.63 If the discretion is not abused, as it was in Farmer, enforce-
57. Id at 143.
58. Id at 145.
59. 417 F. Supp. 498 (D.P.R. 1975).
60. 535 F.2d at 145.
61. Id at 145 (emphasis added) (quoting Coady v. Aguadilla Terminal, Inc., 456 F.2d
677, 679 (1st Cir. 1972)).
62. But again, inherent power may be adequate. See notes 39, 44 & 50supra. A consti-
tutional attack was also found wanting in Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, 461 F.2d 649,
651 (1972). In Hawes, the court enumerated several factors to be considered by a court in
determining whether a bond is necessary. These include ownership by a non-resident plain-
tiff of attachable property in the district, the likelihood of success on the merits, the presence
of a co-plaintiff who is domiciled in the district, the conduct of the litigants, and the pur-
poses of the litigation. 535 F.2d at 144.
63. Local rules on non-resident plaintiff bonds are either discretionary, mandatory upon
request of the defendant or purely mandatory.
Local Rules which provide that a bond is discretionary include: N.D. ILL. C.R. 2; S.D.
ILL. R. 2; N.D. IND. R. 4 ("Upon good cause shown"); D. NEB. R. 15(F); D.N.D. R.
XXIV(C)(1) (upon good cause and defendant's motion); W.D. PA. R. 9(a) (good cause and
motion by defendant); M.D. PA. R. 701.4 ("may"); D.P.R. R. 5 (good cause); W.D. WASH.
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ment of the rule presents no problem.
Rules providing for posting of bonds by non-resident plaintiffs dif-
fer from rules on supersedeas bonds in that they add a requirement not
specified in the federal rules. Once again, a useful purpose is served by
specifying the instances in which the requirement is likely to be im-
posed. This puts lawyers and their clients on notice, alerting them to
the need to show special circumstances if they require treatment that
differs from the court's normal practice.
3. Limitations on discovery
As with cost bonds, local rules that establish a discovery cutoff
date also add a requirement not in the national rules. Discovery time
limits have been criticized on the grounds that they make routine a
decision that should be tailored to a particular case' but they have not
been characterized as impermissible in general. The Columbia Note
authors say, "[t]he wide differences in the times allotted by the rules
themselves suggest that it is not possible to predetermine accurately
how much time is reasonable in particular classes of cases . . . . The
rule-making approach saves judicial time and effort at the expense of
the policies behind the federal discovery rules."65
This is a large topic that cannot be treated in detail here. Convinc-
ing empirical evidence demonstrates that court-imposed discovery
cutoff dates are valuable in keeping discovery within reason.66 No pro-
hibition of this activity exists.67 Abuse of discovery is a matter of wide-
R. G.R. 5(a) ("may"); W.D. Wis. R. 3(a); D. MONT. R. 17(b) (good cause); E.D. PA. R.
38(a).
Local rules which make the posting of a bond mandatory upon defendant request in-
clude: D. IDAHO R. 7; D. ME. R. 33; D. MD. R. 31; D.N.J. R. 35(D); W.D.N.Y. R. 25; E.D.
WASH. R. 23(a).
Posting of a bond is mandatory under the following rules: E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 4(b);
D. HAwAI R. 7; S.D. IND. R. 4; E.D. ILL. R. 2(a).
64. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1262; 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 238.
Raising an issue that is now moot, the authors of the Columbia Note question the related
practice of granting leave to take depositions within twenty days of filing. Columbia Note,
supra note 3, at 1262. Before 1970, rule 26 required the plaintiff to obtain leave of court in
order to take a deposition noticed within that period. The authors are clearly correct that to
grant leave by rule was "an extreme violation of the clear purpose [of the old rule]...
invalid on its face as 'inconsistent' with rule 26." Id
65. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1262.
66. See P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE
CivIm LIGATrVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY ch. VI. (Federal Judicial Center 1978) [hereinafter
cited as JUDICIAL CONTROLS]. See also note 31 supra.
67. Indeed, the Miner Court noted that "rules fixing the time for doing certain acts are
the essence of orderly procedure." 363 U.S. at 648-49. Of course, discretion may not be
abused.
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spread concern, and there have been several recent proposals to limit
discovery rights by rule amendment.6 8 To date, those proposals have
been rejected or modified on the ground that judicial management is a
more flexible and useful approach.6 9 The National Commission for the
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures recently endorsed judicial
controls as a better approach to restrict discovery than more drastic
measures, stating that "when the parties lack incentives to expedite the
case, judicial control is the single most important factor in eliminating
waste and delay."70 Because the power to set an appropriate discovery
deadline is not questioned, and doing so has been found generally per-
missible within the court's discretion, this is another area in which it is
useful to promulgate a local rule, so the bar knows what the court will
allow in most cases.
Ultimately, this becomes a question of local administrative policy,
which the criticisms of local rules do little to illuminate. If a court finds
that its caseload is sufficiently uniform and the judges' policies on dis-
covery sufficiently similar that a ninety-day limitation will be found
realistic in most cases, then it seems useful, as with other aspects of
court discretion, to so inform the bar by local rule. However, if either
condition (or both) does not hold, very likely there should not be a rule.
Certainly there should not be a rule if one or more judges normally
impose no cutoff date or allow a period much longer or shorter than the
others. In that case, a rule will be more misleading than informative.
However, it may be possible to establish agreement on policy and prac-
tice through promulgating a rule, provided the judges of a court agree
to be bound by it.
The Columbia Note authors fail to show any clearly objectionable
features of the cutoff rules they criticize. They criticize an Arkansas
rule, which has since been revoked, that seemed to establish a very high
standard for exceptions to the rule-imposed cutoff because it required
"manifest injustice."'" Actually this rule only prohibited discovery af-
68. See, e.g., ABA Litigation Section, Report of the Special Committee for the Study of
Discovery Abuse (Oct. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
69. The [Advisory] Committee [on Civil Rules] believes that abuse of discovery,
while very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to require such basic
changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases.. . . In the judgment of the
Committee abuse can best be prevented by intervention by the court as soon as
abuse is threatened.
Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 5 (Feb. 1979) (Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of
the United States).
70. Report to the President and the Attorney General 18 (Jan. 22, 1979).
71. E.D. & W.D. ARK. R. 9(e) (rescinded 1979).
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ter the pretrial conference, and no earlier limitation was mentioned.
Unlike the other cutoff rules the Columbia Note authors considered,
that rule was not primarily a discovery provision at all. Its purpose was
to protect the integrity of the pretrial process by assuring that the pre-
trial order would be meaningful. Because discovery between pretrial
and trial can clearly be an instrument of surprise at trial, it is hard to
see how such a limitation could conflict with the structure or purpose of
the rules.
Another criticized provision, Western District of North Carolina
General Rule 10, sets a ninety-day limit on discovery following joinder
of issue, permitting exceptions for the "exceptionally difficult case."
Data now available suggest that this rule provides reasonable guidance,
though perhaps a one hundred twenty-day limit would be better.72
The District of Massachusetts has an odd requirement, regarding
the issuance of a notice of delinquency in responding to interrogatories,
that is more likely to delay discovery than to expedite it. The rule
states:
If a party on whom interrogatories have been served does
not serve answers or objections, as appropriate, within the
time allowed, the party who served the interrogatories may
apply in writing to the clerk for issuance to the delinquent
party of a notice of his delinquency. The clerk shall issue
such a notice on application, and the party making the appli-
cation shall not for 20 days thereafter make a motion for an
order compelling an answer or an order penalizing the delin-
quent party for failing to serve answers.73
In effect, the rule prevents a lawyer from filing a motion to compel until
he has completed this novel step and waited twenty days. Not only
does the rule withdraw for this period a power granted in Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 37(a),74 it also delays any motion for sanctions that
might turn out to be necessary. This rule has not been attacked,75
though it seems more questionable than the cutoff provisions.
72. JUDICIAL CONTROLS, supra note 66, at 80-81.
73. D. MASS. R. 15(g).
74. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) provides for sanctions for failure to make
discovery after giving the appropriate parties notice and making application to the appropri-
ate court.
75. A related group of provisions, designed to assure that discovery is automatic and
does not normally involve the court, was singled out for praise by two commentators. The
most common is the requirement that parties must confer on discovery disputes before ap-
plying to the court for resolution. See Local Rules Survey, supra note 12, at 1048 (citing 4A
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02[5] (2d ed. 1980)).
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4. Interrogation of jurors
Local rules that limit interrogation of jurors after verdict are the
subject of a vigorous attack by Raymond Caballero, a lawyer in El
Paso, Texas.76 Mr. Caballero believes that these rules are "facially in-
valid."" The rule he attacks reads as follows:
No attorney or any party to an action or any other person
shall himself or through any investigator or other person act-
ing for him interview, examine or question any juror, relative,
friend or associate thereof either during the pendency of the
trial or with respect to the deliberations or verdict of the jury
in any action, except on leave of court granted upon good
cause shown.78
Many district courts have promulgated comparable local rules.79
The rules are designed to safeguard the interests of freedom of deliber-
ation, promote stability and finality of verdicts, and protect jurors from
harassment and embarrassment.8" While the law is replete with cases
stating that contact with jurors after trial is either disfavored or prohib-
ited outright unless leave of court is obtained,8' the issues of whether
and how the post-trial interviewing of jurors should be controlled by
court rule have not been resolved.
On the one hand, the lack of an express federal prohibition of
post-trial interviews indicates that the matter should be dealt with on a
case-by-case basis. Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
76. Caballero, Over-Exercise, supra note 5. See also, Conference on Rule Making, supra
note 5, at 48.
77. Caballero, Over-Exercise, supra note 5, at 328.
78. W.D. Tax. R. 20.
79. The following rules regulate the post-verdict interrogation of jurors: N.D. ALA. R.
10 (communication permitted after juror's release from service); S.D. ALA. R. 12 (court's
permission after formal written petition); D. CONN. R. 12(f) (no interrogation of jurors re-
garding deliberations except as permitted by the court in open court); D.D.C. R. 1-28 (leave
of court, good cause, in open court); E.D. LA. R. 14.5 (no jurors may be interviewed without
court order); W.D. LA. R. 16 (leave of court, good cause shown); D. MD. R. 25A (leave of
court, good cause shown); S.D. Miss. R. 16 (attorney shows judge relevant evidence; if
"probable cause" found, attorney can question juror); E.D. Mo. R. 16(D) (leave of court,
good cause); W.D. Tax. R. 20 (leave of court, good cause); D. Wyo. R. 18(b) (written inter-
rogatories with affidavit giving reasons; interview according to interrogatories; second affida-
vit giving results of interview).
80. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 265-69 (1915) (juror impeachment); United
States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 665 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussion of these interests in relation to
FED. R. EvID. 606(b), which regulates juror interrogation).
81. See, e-g., Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel
Daverso v. Hohn, 198 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1952); United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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which allows jurors to give affidavits concerning untoward influences
on their verdicts, also encourages an adjudicative approach to the ques-
tion. In suggesting that reasonable grounds be present before juror in-
terviews are conducted,8 2 and that the interviews be conducted with
"circumspection and restraint,"8 " the American Bar Association implic-
itly favors this approach. The contrary position is embodied in the
view that the post-trial questioning of jurors "must only be conducted
under the strict supervision and control of the court, with inquiry re-
stricted to those matters found by the court as both relevant and
proper. '84 In other words, the court is regarded as best able to address
the interests at stake in such situations.
The absence of federal statutes prohibiting judicial control of juror
interviews seems ample authority, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, and 28 U.S.C.
section 2071, to justify the existence of local rules such as the Western
District of Texas rule. Since none of these local rules have been di-
rectly challenged in court, Mr. Caballero's complaint remains a per-
sonal expression of one side of a policy issue, and an assertion that
discretion has been abused in certain cases. Abuse of discretion in con-
nection with this local rule, however, is a more likely subject for a prac-
tical appeal than on many others, because a final judgment exists.
Again we are dealing with a local rule that defines the court's exer-
cise of discretion. With regard to juror interviews, perhaps this one
only restates the case law. Still, Mr. Caballero's complaint raises a
question of policy, even if the rule in question appears to be lawful.
Caballero certainly has identified a dilemma thrust upon the lawyer
who suspects that improper influence reached a jury. The lawyer may
not interview jurors unless he can show improper influence, yet perhaps
he cannot make a showing until he has interviewed jurors. A national
rule might be considered that would specify more precisely the showing
required for a lawyer to have access to jurors. This presents a useful
opportunity to take advantage of local experience in determining what
should or should not be included in the national rules.
82. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The
Defense Function § 7.3(c) (1971). See also United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d
Cir. 1978).
83. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-30.
84. United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816, 819 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 860
(1975).
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5. Payment of deposition expenses
Two local rules that provide for payment of expenses when a dep-
osition is to be taken at a distant place have been criticized because
they reverse the burden, which is on the party being deposed, to show
that the contemplated discovery will impose a hardship."5 While both
rules are certainly questionable, one of them8 6 only informs the bar of
what the court "may provide" in what would be a clearly lawful protec-
tive order. This provision is little more than notice of the court's likely
stance. The other rule does provide that the court "shall. . . prepay or
secure the cost of travel"' 87 of opposing counsel within certain limits, a
novel provision that surely belongs in the federal rules, if anywhere.
6. Summary
The rules we have examined thus far seem to do little more than
restate the discretion available to the court, or attempt to define how
available discretion will be exercised. The latter seems clearly useful in
informing lawyers of court policy, the former is only slightly less so.
The few rules that define a court policy without explicit provision for
variation when exceptional circumstances are shown are questionable.
This seems to be mostly a drafting error with no great practical signifi-
cance.
88
No error uncovered thus far supports a characterization of local
rules as "an unmitigated disaster" or a reliance "on prefabricated solu-
tions rather than analysis in dealing with unresolved problems."8 9
However, as with the rules that provide travel costs for depositions,
there is always a potential danger when local rules are used to state or
restate court discretion. Drafters of local rules must be careful not to
create a new presumption or reverse an existing burden as they try to
describe a court policy that itself is within the rules.90
B. Minor Problems
A sizable group of purported abuses do not withstand analysis.
85. Cohn, supra note 12, at 283.
86. N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 4(a).
87. E.D. VA. R. 21(B)-(C).
88. Of course, all federal rules, including local rules, are subject to the proviso that:
"They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. In addition, judges have often found the necessary discretion,
whether it was expressly provided or not. See note 50 supra.
89. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1271.
90. See text accompanying notes 119-27 infra.
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Several local rules claimed to be abusive are not, or the problems posed
are moot or inconsequential.
Perhaps the most notable instance of local rules that pose few
problems are those that invoke state practice. The Columbia Note au-
thors say that "some local rules call for state procedure to govern in the
absence of any controlling federal rule. . . Such rules undermine the
whole concept of an independent federal system." 91 Only slightly less
emphatic, Wright and Miller, relying on some of the same rules, say:
Some districts have a local rule saying that the procedure
in the state courts shall govern in the absence of any control-
ling federal rule. Provisions of that kind destroy the power
intended to be granted by the final sentence of Rule 83 and
are at least a vestigial return to the era of conformity with
state procedure that it was a principal purpose of the Civil
Rules to end.92
Rule 83 certainly had the purpose mentioned,93 and a local rule that
required conformity in this fashion would indeed be contrary to its pur-
pose. But no such local rule appears to exist now.94 Consider the fol-
lowing current rules, establishing a procedure in absence of a rule,
which were cited in both commentaries:
95
Whenever a procedural question arises which is not cov-
ered by the provisions of any statute of the United States, or
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or of these rules, it
shall be determined, if possible, by the parallels or analogies
furnished by such statutes and rules. If, however, no such
parallels or analogies exist, then the procedure heretofore pre-
vailing in courts of equity of the United States shall be ap-
91. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1261 n.55 (citing S.D. CAL. R. 27; N.D. GA. R. 2;
N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 19).
92. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 244 (footnotes omitted).
93. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1261 n.55. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4
supra.
94. There is no adequate collection of outdated local rules. The "rules room" in the
library of the Supreme Court contains a file folder for local rules furnished by each court,
pursuant to rule 83. A search of those files did not uncover any "conformity rules" stronger
than those quoted. However, the files may not be complete.
95. Since the Columbia Note was written, the Southern District of California was split,
and the Central District created. Pub. L. No. 89-372, § 3, 80 Stat. 75 (1966) (amending 28
U.S.C. § 84). See Carl Baar, When Judges Lobby: Congress and Court Administration
(1969) (Unpublished Dissertation, U. of Chicago). The Central District itself may shortly be
split. H.R. REP. No. 2505, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Until the new Southern District
recodified its rules in 1979, the Central and Southern Districts had similar rules and num-
bering systems. Thus, present Central District Rule 27 is the Southern District Rule referred
to in the Columbia Note passage quoted at note 91 supra.
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plied or, in the absence thereof, the court may proceed in any
lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any
applicable statute.
96
Whenever a procedural question arises which is not cov-
ered by the provisions of any statute of the United States, or
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, or of the Rules of the United
States District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts
of New York, it shall be determined, if possible, by the paral-
lels and analogies furnished by such statutes and rules. If,
however, no such parallels or analogies exist, then the proce-
dure heretofore prevailing in courts of equity of the United
States shall be applied, or in default thereof, in the discretion
of the court, the procedure which shall then prevail in the
Supreme Court or the Surrogates Court as the case may be of
the State of New York may be applied.97
These rules and their counterparts elsewhere provide nothing more
than advice. They do not require conformity with state practice, they
only suggest that approach among many others. It may add nothing to
tell lawyers that state law "may" be applied if all else fails, but there is
no harm in doing so. The framers of rule 83 probably would have
permitted a more prominent place to the conformity approach, among
the many possibilities mentioned. Addressing a question about the
meaning of rule 83, committee chairman William D. Mitchell said:
That doesn't say they must follow the state practice under the
Conformity Act. They may follow the state practice, if they
think that is an adequate one, and probably will in most cases,
but the Conformity Act does not fill the gap. The district
judges fill it. We hope there are not going to be many gaps,
but you never can tell, and we had to provide for that situa-
tion.9
8
"Conformity" in this broad sense is probably fairly common in
federal courts,9 9 and it is difficult to quarrel with. A recent study by the
96. C.D. CAL. R. 27.
97. S.D.N.Y. G.R. 8.
98. ABA INSTITUTE (Cleveland), supra note 4, at 189.
99. For example, the following local rules specify a procedure in absence of rule: D.
IDAHO R. 25; N.D. ILL. R. 19; N.D. W. VA. R. 2.31. These rules generally state that if no
federal rule is applicable, procedural questions shall be determined "by the parallels or anal-
ogies furnished by such statutes and rules." Note, however, the following deviations: N.D.
OHIO R. 21.04 ("In any proceeding or in any instance where there is no applicable rule or
procedure, a Judge may prescribe the same."); D. ALASKA R. 36 ("The court may in the
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Federal Judicial Center found that voir dire practice often follows state
practice.10 Because most federal trial lawyers have a substantial state
practice, and federal judges are often recruited from their ranks, it
would be surprising if this effect did not exist. As a matter of policy it
seems appropriate for federal courts to follow state practice in most
instances where no other guide exists. It would seem perverse to depart
from procedures judges and lawyers are familiar with unless there is a
compelling reason.
Actually, there are provisions elsewhere that are stronger in urging
conformity than any local rules. For example, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2) provides that service shall be made as follows:
Upon an infant or incompetent person, by serving the
summons and complaint in the mannerprescribed by the law of
the state in which the service is made for the service of sum-
mons or other like process upon any such defendant in an
action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that
state. (emphasis added).
In Dredge Corp. v. Penny 1 ' a local rule was found invalid because
it denied a right to oral argument in motions for summary judgment-
The offending rule has been withdrawn, and no other rules now in ef-
fect contain similar language.102
exercise of its discretion excuse compliance with these rules if interests of justice so re-
quire.").
One commentator identified five local rules that expressly incorporate state practice on
continuances. All of these have been withdrawn except W.D. Wis. R. 10. Local Rules Sur-
vey, supra note 12, at 1059 n.315.
100. "The percentage of federal judges allowing oral participation by lawyers is greatest
in states in which state court rules either emphasize lawyer participation or are discretionary,
as in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 47(a)." G. BERMANTr & J. SHAPARD, THE VOIR DiRE
EXAMINATION, JUROR CHALLENGES, AND ADVERSARY ADVOCACY 23 (1978) (Federal Judi-
cial Center 1968). On the other hand, Mr. Caballero argues cogently that there should be a
national policy on such an important matter, defined in the federal rules. Caballero, Over-
exercise, supra note 5, at 328.
101. 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1964).
102. The requirement established in Dredge, that local rules not preclude a party from
requesting oral argument, nor deny such a request unless the summary judgment motion is
to be denied, is followed by every local rule on summary judgments. The following rules
mention summary judgment motions. Those in which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is
mentioned are flagged with an asterisk: S.D. ALA. R. 8; D. ALASKA R. 5(C), 5(H); D. Aiuz.
R. 11(e), 11(h); C.D. CAL. R. 3(g); E.D. CAL. Civ. R. 116; D. CONN. R. 9(d); D.D.C. R. 1-
9(h); S.D. FLA. R. 10(J); *N.D. GA. R. 91.71, 91.72; *S.D. GA. R. 6.6; D. HAWAII R. 2(3); D.
IDAHO R. 4(e); S.D. ILL. R. 7; N.D. IND. R. 7(b); S.D. IND. R. 8; E.D. LA. R. 3.9, 3.10; M.D.
LA. R. 5(E); *D. NEB. R. 20(i); D.N.M. R. 9(); *N.D.N.Y. R. 10(e); *S.D.N.Y. R. 9(g);
D.R.I. R. 12.1; W.D. TENN. R. 8(d); N.D. TEx. R. 5.2(a); E.D. VA. R. 11(G); D. WYO. R.
6(d).
District Court of Rhode Island Rule 12.1 specifically gives effect to the language used in
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Other rules are no longer improper because provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure with which they once conflicted have
themselves been changed. 0 3 In a few minor instances, old local rules
are now improper because a change in the federal rules introduced a
conflict. For example, a 1963 amendment to rule 58 forbids a district
court to direct attorneys to prepare forms of judgment as a matter of
course. Several local rules still direct attorneys to prepare judg-
ments.' ° While these rules are obsolete and unlawful, it seems likely
that they have minimal practical effect because a judge remains free to
order an attorney to draft a form of judgment in any appropriate case.
In a case that seemed not "appropriate," it seems unlikely that the pres-
ence of the rule would lead the court to insist upon this practice over a
lawyer's objections.
Rule 30 of the Western District of Pennsylvania contains an unu-
sual provision that adds a specification regarding pleading practice.1
0 5
The rule, entitled "Claim for Damages Unliquidated," reads as follows:
"Except for any required jurisdictional allegation of the amount in con-
troversy, a pleading demanding relief for elements of general damages
unliquidated in amount shall, without claiming any specific sum, set
forth only that money damages are claimed and may specify the cate-
gories of damages so claimed."1' 6 This rule is still enforced before this
court. A reference to the rule in a published opinion clearly suggested
the judge expected pleadings to meet this novel requirement. 10 7 Al-
though the rule adds a pleading requirement, it is only a minor addi-
tion essentially consistent with the intent to keep pleadings simple.
The Wright and Miller treatise cites, as the "clearest examples" of
improper local rules, two local rules of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit. 08 Local rule 8 provides that a case will be docketed as
soon as the record is received, "notwithstanding" rule 12 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires a court to wait until the
fee has been paid. The main problem with this rule is the insertion of
Dredge. See also Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 391-92 (6th
Cir. 1975) (court upheld Northern District of Ohio Rule requiring application before oral
argument will be permitted).
103. See Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1262 (deposition limitation).
104. C.D. CAL. R. 7a; E.D. CAL. R. 121; D. IDAHO R. 18a; N.D. OHIO R. 5.02 (prevailing
party prepares "at the court's direction"); E.D. OKLA. R. 23; W.D. OKLA. R. 22; E.D. WASH.
R. 20; D. Wyo. R. 23.
105. This rule, and the objection to it, were brought to the author's attention by Professor
Wright in a personal communication, May, 1978.
106. W.D. PA. R. 30.
107. Knouffv. United States, 74 F.R.D. 555, 557 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
108. 12 WIUGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 219.
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the word "notwithstanding," which makes a valid rule appear invalid.
Local rule 8 only reiterates the position of the Supreme Court in Parissi
v. Telechron.1°9 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 12 were
recently amended to conform to this decision.110 To greater effect,
Wright and Miller also criticize"' First Circuit Rule 11(c), which also
uses the impermissible "notwithstanding," and states that the court
"may decline to refer to portions of the record omitted from the Appen-
dix . . . ." Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 says "[tlhe fact
that parts of the record are not included in the appendix shall not pre-
vent parties or the court from relying on such parts." Here the use of
"may" in the First Circuit rule seems to forestall a part of the conflict,
though conflict does remain. Upon analysis, these "clear" examples of
improper rules appear to be nothing of the kind. Only the gratuitous
use of the word "notwithstanding" suggests an apparent conflict with
the federal rules, but in operation the word adds nothing to either rule.
C Consequential Problems
1. Six-member juries
Perhaps the most serious abuse of the power to make local rules is
the widespread rule' l2 providing for a six-member jury in civil cases.
The spread of this rule seems to have followed from the interest of
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who has urged district courts to adopt
this rule not only as a direct economy measure, to reduce juror expense
and inconvenience, but also to speed the courts' handling of civil jury
trials."
3
Whether six-member juries are a good policy or not is a complex
109. 349 U.S. 46 (1955). The Parissi Court held that "the Clerk's receipt of the notice of
appeal within the 30 day period satisfied the requirements of § 2107, and that untimely
payment of the § 1917 fee did not vitiate the validity of the petitioner's notice of appeal."
Id at 47.
110. See H.R. Doc. No. 96-112 (transmitting amendments to various federal rules, May
1, 1979), at 33-34, 51-52.
111. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 219.
112. Eighty-five of the ninety-five courts had such a rule in September, 1978, as reported
to the Judicial Conference of the United States; Proceedings (1978) at 78.
113. In addition to informal settings within the judiciary, the Chief Justice has en-
couraged use of a smaller civil jury in various addresses and interviews. See Slow Justice is
Inadequate Justice, FORBEs 21, 22 (July 1, 1971); The State of the Federal Judiciary Address
(197 1), reprinted in 57 A.B.A.J 855, 860 (1971); Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary 4
(Feb. 16, 1976), reprinted in 62 A.B.A.I 443 (1976); Year-end Report of the Judiciary 7 (Jan.
1, 1978); State of the Judiciary Address 4 (1978).
At its meeting of March 15-16, 1971, the Judicial Conference of the United States ap-
proved "in principal" a reduction injury size, leaving open the question whether this should
be accomplished by rule or statute. Proceedings (1971), at 5-6.
19811
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problem. The costs and the benefits are not fungible, and they are hard
to calculate on any basis. The savings of six-member juries are all ex-
pressible in dollar terms in principle, though a rigorous accounting
would be complex and has never been undertaken. One would need to
assign a value to jurors' opportunity costs, and add in the juror fees and
apply these to an adequate estimate of the number of juror days to be
saved, assuming that the number of days of jury trial would not change
as a result of the rule. More difficult, but surely possible, would be
estimating the number of trial days a six-member jury rule would save,
and assigning a dollar value to the result, calculating costs to parties
and to the court. These calculations could produce an estimate of the
total savings from the rule, which in the final analysis are probably
substantial.
But how do we make a corresponding calculation of the cost of the
change? Richard Lempert has made a convincing showing that differ-
ent verdicts are highly probable in a small proportion of cases: the
close ones."' It seems likely that Chief Justice Burger did not antici-
pate this, and expected little or no impact of the rule on outcomes. In-
deed, he has said as much in voting with the majority in Colgrove v.
Battin," 5 which upheld local rules providing for six-member juries.
Treating the matter for the moment as one of policy rather than law, it
is quite possible to imagine an acceptable justification for this rule as
an economy measure, though the difficulty of measuring the costs and
benefits assures that the matter will remain controversial.
As a matter of law interpreting rule 83, the Colgrove decision now
seems impossible to sustain. Surely the six-member jury is a "basic
procedural innovation" at least of equal consequence as depositions in
admiralty cases, discussed in Miner v. Atlass." 6 In Ballew v. Geor-
gia,17 the Court found five-member juries to be unconstitutional in a
criminal case, so one may presume that a six-member jury must
amount to a basic change. Colgrove could only be valid if it is read as a
shift away from the Miner standard that would permit innovation and
experimentation within the local rulemaking power on a larger scale
than the Court previously thought permissible. Whatever the problems
114. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible"Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-
Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1975).
115. 413 U.S. 149 (1973). Colgrove has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Hazard, Un-
democratic Legislation, 87 YALE L. 1284, 1285 (1978); Grofman, Jury Decision Making
Models andthe Supreme Court, 2 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 285 (1980); 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 12, at 221-22.
116. 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
117. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
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with six-member juries, however, the rule does not make the case for
critics of local rules because the Supreme Court declared it accepta-
ble.11
8
2. Limits on the number of interrogatories
More compelling as a problem with local rules is the rule adopted
in nine districts that limits the number of interrogatories that may be
filed unless leave is obtained. Maryland Rule 6(B) is typical, though
other courts permit different numbers of interrogatories:' 19 "Unless
otherwise permitted by the court for good cause shown, no party shall
serve upon any other party, at one time or cumulatively, more than 30
written interrogatories, including all parts and subparts, pursuant to
Rule 33, F.R. Civ. P."
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that any
party may serve written interrogatories upon any other party. Rule
26(a) provides that "[u]nless the court orders otherwise under subdivi-
sion (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these methods is not lim-
ited." Thus, the number of interrogatories that may be propounded by
a party is limited only by the court's discretion in protecting a party
from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense," as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides. Such a pro-
tective order will be provided only upon motion of the party seeking
protection and only for good cause shown. The burden of proving that
certain interrogatories, or other discovery devices, are burdensome or
oppressive rests with the party seeking the court's protection.
Case law on this subject is in accord with the liberal interpretation
to be given discovery under the federal rules. In Kainz v. Anheuser-
118. With one unusual circumstance: Colgrove placed Chief Justice Burger in the anom-
alous position of passing on his own work, given his previous role in encouraging use of
reduced civil juries. Judge Weinstein has shown that courts of appeals are sometimes in a
similar position when they are asked to review work they have initiated or approved as a
Judicial Council under 28 U.S.C. § 332. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 126. Since, under 28
U.S.C. § 331, a Chief Justice presides over the Judicial Conference of the United States, this
anomaly is inevitable on occasion, as cases that question Conference policies or actions find
their way to the Court. The author is not aware of any other case in which any Chief Justice
has recused himself on these grounds, so probably Chief Justice Burger was on firm prece-
dential ground in hearing Colgrove. If the Chief Justice's responsibilities to the Judicial
Conference were removed and assigned elsewhere, as Chief Justice Burger has suggested,
this problem would not exist.
119. See, e.g., M.D. FLA. R. 303 (50 maximum); N.D. Miss. R. C-12 (2 sets: 1st set 30
maximum; 2d set 20 maximum); D. Wyo. R. 7(f) (50 maximum); S.D. FLA. R. 10(1) (40
maximum); D. MD. R. 6(B) (30 maximum); S.D. Miss. R. 17 (30 maximum); W.D. TENN. R.
9(g) (30 maximum); S.D. CAL. R. 230-1 (25 maximum); N.D. ILL. R. 9(g) (20 maximum).
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Busch, Inc. ,12o the plaintiff objected to the number of interrogatories
propounded by the defendant on the ground that their excessive
number made the interrogatories vexatious and oppressive. In support
of this claim, the plaintiff alleged that it would take one week to pre-
pare answers to the interrogatories. In overruling the objection of the
plaintiff, the court recognized that answering the interrogatories might
indeed be burdensome.121 The court noted, however, that
the fact that interrogatories may be burdensome is alone not
enough to excuse a party from answering. Use of the liberal
discovery techniques provided by the Federal Rules may
often prove time consuming and expensive ....
The fact that the interrogatories number forty-one is no
basis for objection ....
The limits imposed by the requirements ofjustice [to pro-
tect the party from annoyance, expense, embarrassment, or
oppression] are not to be found in the application of some
fixed formula, but must be determined by the circumstances
of the case.
1 22
In support of this position, the court cited the Advisory Committee note
to the 1948 amendment of rule 33, which states:
it is provided that the number of or the number of sets of
interrogatories to be served may not be limited arbitrarily as a
general policy to any particular number, but that a limit may
be fixed only as justice requires. . . in individual cases. The
party interrogated, therefore, must show the necessity for lim-
itation on that basis.
123
Numerous decisions hold that a specified number of interrogatories
will not be considered burdensome124 and that the burden of proving
that interrogatories are burdensome rests with the party objecting to
them. 1
Local rules dealing with interrogatories also shift the burden of
proof concerning whether or not the interrogatories are oppressive
from the party being interrogated to the interrogator. Finally, they de-
part from a steady evolution that has loosened restrictions on interroga-
120. 15 F.R.D. 242 (N.D. M11. 1954).
121. Id at 247.
122. Id at 247-48.
123. Id See also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 9 (1969) (respondent has the bur-
den of proving that government interrogatories are improper).
124. See, eg., Stoneybrook Tenants Ass'n v. Alpert, 29 F.R.D. 165, 168 (D. Conn. 1961).
125. See, e.g., Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632, 634 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
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tories. Rule 33 was more restrictive before a 1970 amendment, so local
rules that modify it depart from a specific, recently articulated national
policy.
126
So far, no case has invalidated or upheld a local rule limiting in-
terrogatories to a specific number. 127 This lack of judicial review leaves
these local rules on the books even though they conflict with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The local rules may have served a useful
purpose, however, because they have provided an opportunity to gain
experience on a limited scale with a provision that interests several na-
tional bodies. 12 8 So far, where the provision has been tried, the experi-
ence seems to have been generally favorable.
129
3. Restrictions on communications in class action suits
Local rules have been found invalid that restrict communications
by class action lawyers with members of the class. 130 These rules have
their source in the work of a series of national bodies, and the unsatis-
factory experience with them strongly suggests that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions, should be modified.
The Manualfor Complex Litigation (Manual) identifies several poten-
tial abuses to which the class action suit is subject. These are:
1) solicitation of direct legal representation of potential and
actual class members who are not formal parties to the class
action; 2) solicitation of funds or agreements to pay fees and
expenses from potential and actual class members who are
not formal parties to the class action; 3) solicitation by
126. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at § 1261; JUDICIAL CONTROLS, Supra note
66, at ch. I.
127. See Bauer, General Local Rule 9(g) of the United States District Courtfor the North-
ern District of Illinois and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are They Consistent? 9 J.
MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 923 (1976), for a highly critical analysis.
128. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 68, at 20. Since the Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure in its February 1979 revision dropped the proposal to limit interrogato-
ries by local rule, we do not know the Committee's rationale, or whether it has taken
advantage of local experience, because no comments were printed on proposals that were
dropped. However, the earlier Preliminary Draft of March 1978 had converted the ABA
proposal for a uniform national rule into a new proposal that authorized local rules to limit
interrogatories. The Committee made specific reference to local conditions that might gov-
ern the choice among courses of action and requested the views of bench and bar on the
point. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Mar. 1978) (Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States).
129. Oral reports to the author by judges in the Northern District of Illinois, the District
of Maryland, and the Southern District of California.
130. E.g., W.D. PA. R. 34(d).
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defendants of requests by class members to opt out in class
actions under subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23; and 4) unau-
thorized direct or indirect communications from counsel or a
party, which may misrepresent the status, purposes and effects
of the action and of court orders therein and which may con-
fuse actual and potential class members and create impres-
sions which may reflect adversely on the court or the
administration of justice.
131
To prevent these abuses, the Manual recommends that courts limit
communications between parties and their attorneys in a class action
and actual or potential members of the class who are not formal parties
to the suit.132 The Manual also provides a "model" rule and order
prohibiting the types of communications listed above and allowing
some others.
133
Pursuant to the Manual's recommendation, eleven districts have
131. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 27 (West 1977) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
132. Id
133. Suggested Local Rule No. 7 states:
In every potential and actual class action under Rule 23, F.R. Civ. P., all par-
ties thereto and their counsel are hereby forbidden, directly or indirectly, orally or
in writing, to communicate concerning such action with any potential or actual
class member not a formal party to the action without the consent of and approval
of the communication by order of the Court. Any such proposed communication
shall be presented to the Court in writing with a designation of or description of all
addressees and with a motion and proposed order for prior approval by the Court
of the proposed communication and proposed addressees. The communications
forbidden by this rule include, but are not limited to, (a) solicitation directly or
indirectly of legal representation of potential and actual class members who are not
formal parties to the class action; (b) solicitation of fees and expenses and agree-
ments to pay fees and expenses, from potential and actual class members who are
not formal parties to the class action; (c) solicitation by formal parties to the class
action of requests by class members to opt out in class actions under subparagraph
(b)(3) of Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P.; and (d) communications from counsel or a party
which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the action, and
of actual or potential Court orders therein, which may create impressions tending,
without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, the Court, or the
administration of justice.- The obligations and prohibitions of this rule are not ex-
clusive. All other ethical, legal and equitable obligations are unaffected by this
rule.
This rule does not forbid (1) communications between an attorney and his
client or a prospective client, who has on the initiative of the client or prospective
client consulted with, employed or proposed to employ the attorney, or (2) commu-
nications occurring in the regular course of business or in the performance of the
duties of a public office or agency (such as the Attorney General) which do not
have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel or misrepresenting the status,
purposes or effect of the action and orders therein. Nor does the rule forbid com-
munications protected by a constitutional right. However, in the latter instance the
erson making the communication shall within five days after such communication.
fle with the Court a copy of such communication, if in writing, or an accurate and
substantially complete summary of the communication if oral.
Id at 187-88.
LOCAL RULES IN FEDERAL COURTS
promulgated rules that limit communication between actual and poten-
tial parties to a class suit. 134 These rules have varied in scope from
those that adopt the Suggested Local Rule No. 7 in the Manual verba-
tim, to those that are broader, and in effect prohibit all communication
between parties and non-parties without obtaining leave of court. Lo-
cal rule 34(d) of the Western District of Pennsylvania was of this type
prior to its invalidation.
Rules and orders prohibiting communication in class suits have
been attacked as being contrary to the policy underlying rule 23, and as
being unconstitutional prior restraints upon freedoms of speech and as-
sociation. In Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp. , the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals struck down rule 34(d) of the Western District of
Pennsylvania, which prohibited any communication between parties,
or their attorneys, and potential class members not party to the suit
without prior court approval. 36 The court in Rodgers distinguished
between the rule's effect upon litigants before and after class determi-
nation had been made. The court held only that the restraint imposed
by rule 34(d) was outside the rulemaking power of the district court in
that it required prior judicial approval of communications that seek to
encourage common participation in a lawsuit.137 Local rule 34(d) was
thus found to be outside the scope of the rulemaking power granted by
rule 83 because of its inconsistency with the purpose of rule 23.138 The
court declined to address the issue of whether rule 34(d) was an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on the plaintiffs rights of freedom of speech
and association. 39 The court also did not address the validity of rule
34(d) when applied to a class that had already been determined."4
Two years later, in Coles v. Marsh,'4' the Third Circuit considered
a court-imposed restraint upon communications between formal and
potential parties to a class suit. In Coles, the trial court, upon defend-
ant's motion, had entered an order prohibiting certain communications
between the plaintiff, her attorney, and third parties, including poten-
tial members of the class.' 42 The order of the court was taken in sub-
134. S.D. FLA. R. 19(b); N.D. FLA. R. 17(b); M.D. FLA. R. 4.04(e); N.D. GA. R. 221.2;
N.D. ILL. R. 22; E.D. LA. R. 2.12(e); D. MD. R. 20; S.D. OHIO R. 3.9.4; S.D. TFX. R. 6; N.D.
TEx. R. Misc. 688; W.D. WASH. R. 23(g).
135. 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).
136. Id at 166.
137. Id at 164.
138. Id
139. Id
140. Id
141. 560 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1977).
142. Id at 187.
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stantial part from Sample Pretrial Order No. 15 as set out in the
Afanual.143
Defendant's motion for the order was based upon plaintiffs depo-
sition testimony that she had contacted present and former employees
of defendant with the hope of interesting them in her employment dis-
crimination suit. She also testified that she intended to continue this
activity. 1" In vacating the order, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
stated, "[w]e do not accept the idea expressed by the defendant that
plaintiff's activities represent abuses of the class action device. Rather,
plaintiffs activities were directed toward effectuating the purposes of
Rule 23 by encouraging common participation in the litigation of her
sex/race discrimination claim."'145 Basing its decision on Rodgers, the
143. Id at 188. The MANUAL also provides Sample Pretrial Order No. 15, which states:
In this action, all parties hereto and their counsel are forbidden directly or
indirectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such action with any
potential or actual class member not a formal party to the action without the con-
sent and approval of the proposed communication and proposed addressees by
order of this Court. Any such proposed communication shall be presented to this
Court in writing with a designation of or description of all addressees and with a
motion and proposed order for prior approval by this Court of the proposed com-
munication. The communications forbidden by this order include, but are not lim-
ited to, (a) solicitation directly or indirectly of legal representation of potential and
actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (b) solicitation
of fees and expenses and agreements to pay fees and expenses from potential and
actual class members who are not formal parties to the class action; (c) solicitation
by formal parties to the class action of requests by class members to opt out in class
actions under subparagraph (b)(3) of Rule 23, F.R. Civ. P.; and (d) communica-
tions from counselor a party which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes
and effects of the class action, and of any actual or potential Court orders therein
which may create impressions tending, without cause, to reflect adversely on any
party, any counsel, this Court, or the administration ofjustice. The obligations and
prohibitions of this order are not exclusive. All other ethical, legal and equitable
obligations are unaffected by this order.
This order does not forbid (I) communications between an attorney and his
client or a prospective client, who has on the initiative of the client or a prospective
client consulted with, employed or proposed to employ the attorney, or (2) commu-
nications occurring in the regular course of business or in the performance of the
duties of a public office or agency (such as the Attorney General) which do not
have the effect of soliciting representation by counsel, or misrepresenting the status,
purposes or effect of the action and orders therein.
If any party or counsel for a party asserts a constitutional right to communi-
cate with any member of the class without prior restraint and does so communicate
pursuant to that asserted right, he shall within five days after such communication
ile with the Court a copy of such communication, if in writing, or an accurate and
substantially complete summary of the communication if oral.
A hearing at which applications may be presented for relaxation of this order
and proposed communications with actual or potential members of the class is
hereby set for - at -m.
Dated this -----day of - , 19- .
Sample Pretrial Order No. 15, MANUAL, supra note 131, at 188-89.
144. 560 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1977).
145. Id
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court held that the district court lacked the power to impose any re-
straint on communication for the purpose of preventing the recruitment
of additional parties or the solicitation of financial or other support. 1
46
Such an order would be upheld only where the moving party articu-
lated the particular abuses by which it was threatened and the court
found a satisfactory basis for relief consistent with the policies of rule
23.147
Rule 2.12(e) of the Eastern District of Louisiana, which incorpo-
rates the exact language of Suggested Local Rule No. 7, was upheld as
consistent with the policy of rule 23 in Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates,
Inc. 148 In Waldo, the defendant moved to have plaintiffs class action
dismissed on the ground that plaintiff violated rule 2.12(e). 149 Whether
rule 2.12(e) had in fact been violated was referred to a special master,
whereupon the plaintiff moved to have the rule declared invalid on the
grounds that it violated the first and fifth amendments and exceeded
the court's rulemaking authority. 5 '
While recognizing that rule 2.12(e) did limit the exercise of certain
rights otherwise guaranteed by the first amendment, the court found
that these rights were "properly limited pursuant to sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interests."'' However, this determination was
made on the basis that rule 2.12(e) was not a "prior restraint," and thus
the court did not examine the rule with a "heavy presumption" against
its validity.'5 2 The court also considered whether the rule as drafted
"needlessly restrained" the freedoms protected by the first amendment.
Plaintiffs alleged that specific abuses should be matched with specific
prohibitory rules, as opposed to adopting an across-the-board restric-
tion. In rejecting this line of attack, the court noted that the likelihood
of drafting a rule which would specifically address all potential abuses
was extremely dubious as a practical matter.'53
After disposing of the plaintiffs contention that rule 2.12(e) vio-
lated the fifth amendment, the court addressed the claim that rule
2.12(e) exceeded the rulemaking power of the district court. Recogniz-
ing that Rodgers had determined that a similar rule was inconsistent
with rule 83, the court stated:
146. Id
147. Id
148. 433 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. La. 1977).
149. Id at 786.
150. Id at 787.
151. Id at 788.
152. Id at 789.
153. Id at 791.
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[wie categorically oppose the notion that a policy allowing un-
fettered communication to encourage participation in a class
suit is consistent with the purpose of Federal Rule 23. The
potential abuses attendant upon such unregulated communi-
cation clearly undermine the efficacy of the class action de-
vice. By proscribing such communications as tend to solicit
legal services and/or fund contributions, the rule protects the
right of the class membership to judicial redress that is not
unnecessarily burdened. By foreclosing unapproved notices
of the right to opt out and preventing misrepresentations of
the lawsuit's status, purpose or effect, the membership's enti-
tlement to a fair trial is safeguarded. . . . We therefore re-
gard Local Rule 2.12(e) as entirely consistent with and in
furtherance of the purpose of fully and fairly disposing of
class-wide claims and remedying class-wide grievances in a
single proceeding.154
A similar approach was recently adopted by a divided panel of the
Fifth Circuit, but then was rejected by the full court en banc; the en
banc court was upheld by the Supreme Court. In Bernard v. Gf Oil
Co. ," the panel majority said,
[a]ny communication between parties and class members may
mislead the class members by appearing to reflect the opinion
of the court rather than that of the party making the commu-
nication . . . . Thus, there are many substantial reasons a
trial judge may believe that an order such as that suggested in
the Manual on Complex Litigation is justified.1 56
Judge Godbold dissented because he believed the restraints imposed by
the court "contravene Rule 23 . . .and violate freedom of speech and
freedom of association as guaranteed by our Constitution."1 57 He sus-
tained this view in writing for the majority of the en banc court.
Those who have commented on local rules that limit communica-
tion in class action suits generally favor the approach taken by the
Third Circuit and the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit en banc in
Bernard. A Note on the Rodgers case states,
154. Id at 794. It should be noted that this court was passing on the validity of its own
rule, an anomalous situation that is common in the local rule context. See WEINSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 126.
155. 596 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'dinpart, 619 F.2d 459 (1980) (en banc), a ifd, 101
S. Ct. 2193 (1981).
156. Id at 1260.
157. Id at 1263 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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the court is correct that local rule 34(d) is inconsistent with
federal rule 23. The minimum purpose of rule 23 is to allow
adjudication in a single action of claims which meet the rule's
requirements. A broad ban on communication with absent
class members creates obstacles to class litigation in two ways.
First, it prevents representative plaintiffs and their attorneys
from obtaining from absentees information necessary to
demonstrate the appropriateness of class certification and to
prove the merits of their claims. Second, the rule prevents
class representatives from gathering "front money" necessary
to pay for attorney's fees, notice expenses, and other litigation
CoStS.
158
Further, the Note points out that traditional concepts of unprofessional
solicitation, which such rules are meant to prevent, may not be appro-
priate in class suits.'59
Other commentators suggest that limited categories of forbidden
communications be established, and the class attorney or class oppo-
nent be required to file a copy of any communication with the court
before disseminating it to the class.' 60 Courts screening these commu-
nications would limit their inspection to a search for "blatantly abu-
sive" communications that are likely to cause irreparable injury unless
restrained in advance of dissemination. The court could rely on oppos-
ing counsel to bring to light any other suspect communications and
then hold a hearing to establish whether there was a violation of the
restrictions. If a violation were established, the court could order the
offending party to distribute corrective notices to the class, in addition
to taking any other appropriate disciplinary action. This position
seems to be substantially in accord with the Third Circuit's mandate in
Coles that the party requesting a restraint on communication show the
potential abuses that he seeks to curb before an order restraining com-
munication can be issued by the court.'
6'
The Southern District of Texas amended its broad restriction on
158. Note, Rules of Civil Procedure-Local Rule Barring Communications with Absent
Class Members Held Beyond Rulemaking Authority of District Courts, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1911, 1917-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]. Another valuable note on this case
is Note, Federal Procedure--Class Actions, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 1086 (1975).
159. Harvard Note, supra note 158, at 1918. Cf. Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart,
Inc., 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972) (court said, in an atypical fact situation, that it is not
necessarily improper to seek out potential class members before filing a complaint).
160. Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1602 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Class Actions].
161. See text accompanying notes 141-46 supra.
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communications in class actions in October, 1976.162 The amended
rule prohibits only communications that deal with the four potential
abuses enumerated in the Manual. All other communications are al-
lowed, but notice of any communication must be filed with the court
five days prior to its dissemination so that the court can prohibit any
communication found to be improper.
Thus, local rules restricting communications in class action suits
are of questionable validity. Rules that are broader in scope than the
Manua's Suggested Local Rule No. 7 are contrary to the policy under-
lying rule 23, but none of the rules in force among the district courts is
of this type. The rules that follow the Manual's suggestion are also
potentially troublesome. This situation exposes a policy dispute to the
national rulemakers, including Congress.1 63 Rule 23 has been found,
through experience in the courts implementing it, to permit or en-
courage behavior apparently indistinguishable from common law solic-
itation. Court efforts to control this and related "abuses" undermine
the rule's operation"6 and may even be unconstitutional. The local
rules have exposed the problems and have provided experience in at-
tempting to solve it so that future action on class communications will
be better focused and more informed.
65
4. Pretrial procedure
The local rule experience offers guidance in another area in which
a common local rule has been found invalid, that of pretrial procedure
under rule 16.166 This is an area peculiarly suited to administration by
local rule, as the original rulemakers indicated both in the rules them-
162. S.D. TEx. R. 6.
163. There have been numerous proposals involving rule 23. See Developments -Class
Actions, supra note 160, at 1623-44.
164. A noted authority, responding to this dilemma, asks, "why should 'solicitation' by an
attorney-absent any coercion or deception-be condemned... " Miller, Of Frankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L.
Rav. 664, 666 n.16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
165. It should be noted that local rules based on suggestions in the MANUAL draw upon a
lengthy process of notice and comment not unlike the activity surrounding the birth of a new
national rule. The latter has been compared to the gestation of an elephant: "First there is a
great deal of movement by large bodies. Several years later, a birth occurs." A more precise
description can be found at 4 WIorr & MILLER, supra note 12, at §§ 1005, 1007. See note
215 infra.
166. McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393,400-02 (4th Cir. 1976) (Northern District of West
Virginia Rule 2.09, which provided for dismissal of action not brought to trial within 12
months, held invalid). For a detailed discussion of this case, see McDermott, The Pretrial
Order and McCargo v. Hedrick: Effective Management or Unproductive Formalism? 4 JusT.
Sys. J. 245 (1978).
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selves and in their contemporary comments about them.167 Rule 16168
is one of the few that specifically suggests a local rule, 169 a fact duly
noted by Judge Charles Clark in responding to a question on the sub-
ject:
The question is on Rule 16: Is that to be provided for by local
rules or by the court in individual cases? The answer is that it
is to be done by the court either in individual cases or by es-
tablishing a pre-trial calendar by rule. You will notice that
whenever, in the rules, we provide for general local rules, it is
referred to explicitly.
170
In a somewhat broader context, Mr. Mitchell said, "[t]he [federal] rules
do not apply to calendar administration . . . . The conditions differ
widely in the country and that is left to local district court rules."
'1 71 •
Rule 16 has not been amended since it was promulgated in 1938,
although practice under the rule is more complex than was contem-
plated when it was drafted. Most current practice appears to be consis-
tent with the rule and to serve its broad purposes, although lawyers
often complain that courts' requirements are counterproductive and
judges sometimes make excessive and unnecessary demands. However,
in some respects, present practice has extended the rule so far that it no
167. See Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee on Local District Court
Rules 8 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Knox Report]. The committee notes, for example, that
techniques for calendar management suitable for large courts will not be suitable for smaller
courts.
168. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
to appear before it for a conference to consider
(I) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which
will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for find-
ings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the confer-
ence, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the
parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to
those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when
entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to
prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-
trial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided
and may either confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend
it to all actions.
169. The last sentence states: "The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial
calendar.. . ..." See note 168 supra.
170. ABA INSTrrUTE (Wash. D.C.), supra note 4, at 71.
171. ABA INsTrruTE (N.Y.), supra note 4, at 231.
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longer serves the essential purpose of advising attorneys. Local rules,
however, provide the only source of information about a bewildering
variety of preliminary conferences, scheduling conferences, and final
pretrial conferences, each of which is the subject of different and some-
times conflicting requirements by different judges and courts.
172
Despite the problems with local rules, convincing evidence indi-
cates that judicial case management under rule 16 is the best hope
available for controlling the duration and possibly the expense of civil
litigation. 73 Perhaps rule 16, therefore, should be amended to better
describe contemporary practice and to relieve the present burden on
local rules. Changes that would alleviate many of the problems associ-
ated with pretrial local rules include: (1) explicitly providing for an
early conference at which a schedule would be agreed upon and any
problems ironed Out; 174 (2) assigning a responsibility to the court to
assure an expeditious schedule to complete the case; (3) listing require-
ments to be imposed in most cases, for preparation of the proposed
pretrial order; and (4) outlining specific sanctions for failure to comply
with the pretrial order. If rule 16 is amended, the ninety-five district
courts have gathered vast experience with alternative pretrial tech-
niques that can guide the national rulemakers.
75
5. Press conduct
The common local rule regulating press conduct has also been at-
tacked as invalid. Local district court rules that address the fair
trial/free press issue proliferated in the years foliowing the Supreme
Court's decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 76 in which the Court stated
that local courts must take "strong measures"' 77 to ensure that pretrial
publicity does not prevent a fair trial. Justice Clark, in dictum, stated
that "the courts must take such steps by rule or regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interference."' 178 This
statement prompted eighty of the ninety-five district courts to adopt
172. Some flavor of this diverse practice can be gathered in Cohn, supra note 12; Flan-
ders, supra note 30. The proliferation of pretrial rules has been attacked in Kahn, supra note
5, at 34.
173. See note 66 supra.
174. See Rubin, The Managed Calendar- Some Pragmatic Suggestions About Achieving
the Just, Speedy and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. SYS.
J. 135, 140-41 (1978).
175. This experience was used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court when it promulgated a
pretrial rule in 1974. Wis. R. Civ. PROC. 802.10, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 637 (1975).
176. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
177. Id at 362-63.
178. Id at 363.
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local rules restricting the reporting of proceedings by the press. 179
After Sheppard, the district courts were armed by the bench and
the bar with a variety of proposals to implement Justice Clark's sugges-
tion.18 0 Many of the present fair trial/free press local rules reflect the
guidelines and specific recommendations contained in the Kaufman
Report, prepared by the Judicial Conference of the United States in
1969. Not surprisingly, the cases in which fair trial/free press rules
have been challenged concern Kaufman Report progeny.
In United States v. CBS, s' district court orders that forbade the
sketching for publication of court proceedings, either inside the court-
room or from memory outside the courtroom, were held to be constitu-
tionally impermissible. Though made pursuant to Northern District of
Florida Rule 16, the orders in question conflicted with an express ca-
veat of the Kaufman Report which stated that "[tihe committee does
not presently recommend any direct curb or restraint on publication by
the press of potentially prejudicial material. Such a curb, it feels, is
both unwise as a matter of policy and poses serious constitutional
problems."18 2 The court noted in passing that only three of the eighty
district courts which have fair trial/free press rules have adopted the
suggestion in the Kaufman Report that in certain widely-publicized
cases the court may direct that "no photograph be taken or sketch
made of any juror within the environs of the court."'
'8 3
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,"8 4 Northern District of
Illinois Local Criminal Rule 1.07, which was substantially similar both
179. See Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62 A.B.A.J. 55
(1976).
180. See, e.g., NEw YORK CITY BAR ASS'N, SPECIAL COMM. ON RADIO, TELEVISION,
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967)
(Medina Report); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FREE TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS (approved draft, 1968) (Reardon Report); ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM.
ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE TO ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS
OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (rev. draft, Nov. 1975); Judicial Conference of the United
States, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Fair Trial-Free
Press" Issue (Kaufman Report), 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969) (amended, 51 F.R.D. 135 (1970))
[hereinafter cited as Kaufman Report].
181. 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
182. 45 F.R.D. at 401-02.
183. 497 F.2d at 106 n.5.
184. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v. Chicago Council
of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). For a lengthy discussion of Bauer and of fair trial/free
press issues generally, see Note, ABA and Local Court Disciplinary Rule's Standards for
Prohibiting Attorney Comments on Pending Investigations or Litigation Violate First Amend-
ment Protections, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1234 (1976); Note, Trial Publicity Rules, 54 TEx.
L. REV. 1158 (1976).
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to the Kaufman recommendations and to Disciplinary Rule 7-107(A)-
(E), was held to be an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction of law-
yers' first amendment right to comment publicly and receive comment
on pending litigation. The court stated that local rules restricting pub-
lic access to information on pending litigation will be scrutinized less
closely than quintessential "prior restraints," but more closely than leg-
islative restrictions.' 85 In restricting the flow of information to the pub-
lic, local rules are to exhibit "clearness, precision, and narrowness."'
186
The court ruled that only those comments that pose a "serious and im-
minent threat" of interference with the fair administration of justice
can constitutionally be proscribed pursuant to local rule.'8 7 Rule 1.07
had proscribed public comments which merely exhibited a "reasonable
likelihood" of interfering with a fair trial or of otherwise prejudicing
the due administration of justice.
18
It seems that present fair trial/free press rules, based on the care-
fully considered recommendations of the Judicial Conference and the
Bar, do much to ameliorate the inherent tension between first and sixth
amendment rights. Court orders that embellish or go beyond the sweep
of the fair trial/free press rules carry the risk of impinging on these
constitutional rights.'8 9
6. Attorney behavior
A final serious conflict posed by local rules appears in the efforts of
some courts to regulate attorney behavior. 90 The authority of the dis-
trict courts to promulgate rules governing admission to the bar is de-
rived from legislative grants of power 91 and inherent judicial power.
185. 522 F.2d at 248-49.
186. Id at 249. See Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970) (citing Craig v.
Harvey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947)), in which the court invalidated a provision of Northern District
of Illinois Rule 34 that extended the court's rule concerning television coverage and photo-
graphs to floors of the federal building above and below the courtroom area.
187. 522 F.2d at 249 (citing Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1970),
which formulated a restrictive constitutional standard for examining local rules that pros-
cribe first amendment rights).
188. 522 F.2d at 249.
189. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979), which held that a reporter does not have a right of access to pretrial procedures in
criminal cases, changes the complexion of case law on the fair trial/free press issue. Its
impact on rulemaking in this area, however, is as yet unclear.
190. See generalljy 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 228-29.
191. "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to man-
age and conduct cases therein." 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976).
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The Supreme Court in Exparte Secombe 192 held that it rests "exclu-
sively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its
officers." 1 93 Subsequent cases have affirmed a state's right to prescribe
conditions for membership in the bar. 194 In Brown v. Supreme Court of
Virginia,19 the general principle was outlined:
[T]he highest court of a state may prescribe rules relating to
admission to the bar even in absence of a statute. The admis-
sion or exclusion of an attorney is not the exercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power and the
admission of an attorney may, with propriety, be entrusted to
the courts.
196
The Knox Committee Report1 97 on local district court rules deter-
mined that rules governing attorney admission fall specifically within
the intended scope of rule 83. The authors of the report expressed the
view that completely uniform rules were "neither feasible nor desira-
ble" though they advised that "supplementary local rules be kept at a
minimum."' 198 Even critics of local rules have acknowledged that pro-
cedures for admission to the bar are satisfactorily within the confines of
rule 83.199
Because the courts clearly have authority over admission to prac-
tice, the issue is what standards the courts may impose. The Knox Re-
port proposed a model rule for the eligibility of attorneys: "Any person
who is a member in good standing of the bar of (1) the highest court of
this state or of (2) the highest court of any other state, is eligible for
admission to the bar of this court .... -200 The Northern District of
Oklahoma Rule 5(c) typifies local rules that follow the Knox proposal
in that it requires that a person be a member of the bar of the Supreme
Court, a United States Court of Appeals or District Court, or of the
highest court of any state. Other district courts, however, stipulate that
an attorney must be a resident of the state.20' At least one circuit has
held that the requirement that applicants for admission to the bar be
192. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856). Accord, Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
193. 60 U.S. at 13.
194. See, e.g., In Re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Emmons v. Smitt, 58 F. Supp. 869
(E.D. Mich. 1944), afid, 149 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1945).
195. 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va. 1973), aft'dsub nonz. Titus v. Supreme Court of Virginia,
414 U.S. 1034 (1973).
196. 359 F. Supp. at 554 (citing Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)).
197. See note 167 supra.
198. Knox Report, supra note 167, at 7.
199. 12 WPIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 220.
200. Knox Report, supra note 167, at 29.
201. E.g., S.D. Omo R. 2.4.2.
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state residents is a "reasonable classification designed to serve the com-
pelling state interest of preventing misconduct by itinerant or nonresi-
dent practitioners. "202
Many districts also provide that inpro hac vice appearances, an
out-of-state attorney must associate himself with a resident attorney.
There are two justifications for this requirement: local counsel are
needed because they are better acquainted with local court procedures,
and joinder of local counsel permits the court to have a member of its
bar professionally responsible for litigation. Despite criticisms of these
justifications, it has been held that permission to appearpro hac vice is
not a right, but a privilege.2 "3
Local rules requiring joinder of local counsel, however, cannot be
applied when they deny a party access to the federal courts. Accord-
ingly, a local rule should be waived or admissionpro hac vice granted
when an out-of-state attorney cannot find a local attorney who will sign
the pleadings with him.2" Nor can it be applied when the result will be
to preclude the appearance of out-of-state attorneys in civil rights ac-
tions.2
0 5
In an attempt to exclude out-of-state counsel, a district court in
Alabama advanced the following rationale for a local rule dealing with
representation by counsel in civil rights cases:
[Bleing aware not only of the legal but of the social problems
involved in the cases filed and prosecuted in this Court that
have as their basis the alleged violations of civil and constitu-
tional rights, [the Court] is of the opinion that it is not in the
public interest nor in the Court's interest for the Court to con-
tinue to permit litigants to employ or utilize counsel in this
field of litigation when all parties are not actively represented
by counsel that reside in this district, as has been the practice
heretofore followed in some instances. This Court is of the
further opinion that such a practice does not make for the
proper and efficient administration of justice and tends to
make this Court's burden in this type of litigation more diffi-
cult in that assistance to the Court is not immediately and
202. Tang v. Appellate Div., N.Y. Sup. Ct., 373 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aft'd,
487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
203. Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91, 92 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. deniedsub nom. Fitzgerald
v. Cassidy, 355 U.S. 958 (1958).
204. Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 1964).
205. Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1968). The court's holding concerned
"non-fee generating cases" but the court made it clear that attorneys may still seek a fee and
have the rule apply in appropriate cases. Id at 244 n.5.
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readily available from counsel actively participating in and
fully cognizant of all aspects of said cases.
20 6
This poorly-drafted local rule requires that whenever an allegation in-
volving a violation of civil rights is to be heard,
each litigant must have at least one legal representative of rec-
ord who permanently resides in this district and is regularly
admitted to practice before the Court, and who during all
phases of the litigation should be personally aware of the vari-
ous social and/or legal problems involved and will be fully
informed as to all aspects of the litigation, and who has au-
thority to speak for his client and will be readily available to
the Court for assistance, counsel and advice. Said local coun-
sel in all such cases including the United States Attorney for
the Middle District of Alabama when said litigation concerns
actions by or against the United States, shall appear and ac-
tively participate during all stages and phases of said litiga-
tion, including any proceedings deemed necessary by the
Court to enforce its orders, degrees and judgments.20 7
Under the standards enunciated above for controlling appearances by
out-of-state counsel, Alabama Rule 1 would fail.
A difficult question that is still unresolved concerns whether rules
requiring that local counsel "actively associate"2 8 or "meaningfully
participate" 20 9 in the lawsuit deny a party access to the federal courts.
It is uncertain what these phrases mean, but the following local rules
offer some indications. The District of Idaho Rule 2(d) states that a
resident "designee shall personally appear with non-resident attorney
on all matters heard and tried before the court." The District of Mon-
tana Rule l(c) requires that "local counsel must be furnished with all
factual, evidentiary, and legal information necessary for him to intelli-
gently act on behalf of the party he represents; and he must also be
vested with full and complete authority to act on behalf of and bind the
party he represents. . . ." Finally, Eastern District of Virginia Rule
7(D) provides that "no pleading or notice required to be signed by
counsel shall be accepted by clerk unless signed by [resident] counsel."
This rule was recently upheld in Willis v. Semmes, Bowen & Semmes.2 1 °
206. M.D. ALA. R. I.
207. Id
208. D. ME. R. 3(d)(1); D. MrNN. R. 1(d).
209. D. HAWAII R. 1(e); D. ORE. R. 3(c); D. COLO. R. 1(b).
210. 441 F. Supp. 1235, 1246 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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D. Miscellaneous problems
Other local rules and procedures that have been criticized include
those that provide for alternate jurors to be selected from regular juries
only when a trial is complete," l' those that modify the requirement of
rule 5(d) that all discovery papers be flied, 12 those that provide for
dismissals for want of prosecution if the suit has been inactive for a
specified period,213 and those that define the time when judgment is
entered.214 None of the attacks are persuasive, though local rules cer-
tainly can be found that suffer from poor drafting and other errors of
detail.
III. ADOPTION OF LOCAL RULES
The courts' exercise of the local rulemaking power has been criti-
cized for the method by which rules are drafted. District court per-
formance in this regard is criticized especially for failing to meet the
high standard set by the national process. Though subject to some crit-
icism and reappraisal, the national rulemaking process is widely ad-
mired.21 5 Proposed revisions of national rules have been widely
211. United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531, 539-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841
(1979).
212. Cohn, supra note 12, at 290-91.
213. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1272-75. Local rules regarding dismissal for want
of prosecution, which were questioned in McCargo, are well within the scope of the district
courts' inherent powers. As stated in Shotkin v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d
825, 826 (10th Cir. 1948) (referring to District of Colorado Rule 8): "[a] district court of the
United States is vested with power to dismiss an action for failure of plaintiff to prosecute it
with reasonable diligence. The power is inherent and independent of any statute or rule."
See also United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d 1098, 1103 (2d Cir. 1975). It is argued, however,
that local rules on the subject are superfluous, especially in light of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b). See McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 396 n.3 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing Link
v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). There is also the danger that such local rules, if
not superfluous, might be inconsistent with rule 41(b) or other federal rules. In Radack v.
Norwegian Am. Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963), for example, provisions of
Eastern District of New York General Rule 23 were found to violate the mandate of now-
abrogated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d). Id at 542.
214. See Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1269-71.
215. See Hazard, Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Hazard]; 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at §§ 1005, 1007. Critics have focused on
the dual role of the Supreme Court in promulgating and also reviewing rules. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 2, at ch. IV. The limited opportunities in the past for public comment and dis-
cussion, and the occasional intrusion of rulemaking into areas that have the character of
advisory opinions, have also been criticized. Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the
orders promulgating rules on the grounds that revised rules are not really the Court's work.
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 374 U.S. 865,
869-70 (1963). See Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power ofthe Supreme Court.- .4 Contempo-
rary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673 (1975).
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circulated and commented upon, hearings have occasionally been held,
and expert advice of scholars, practitioners and judges is available
through the relatively diverse character of the advisory committees.
The national rules are subject to searching scrutiny as they pass from
an Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee on Practice and
Procedure, to the Judicial Conference of the United States, to the
Supreme Court, and finally to Congress. The role of Congress is espe-
cially significant because elected officials may intervene in this other-
wise undemocratic process" 6 if they believe the rulemakers have
stepped beyond the technical, procedural tasks assigned them2 17 and
have begun to intrude into substantive areas.
We are told that the district courts have undertaken an essentially
similar task without the searching examination, expertise, or scrutiny
appropriate to it.
[The process by which local rules are made is simply not
suited for the complex and controversial subjects to which
many local rules are addressed. When the Civil Rules are
amended, the process is extremely careful. . . . The process
is calculated to ensure that any changes reflect the best think-
ing of the entire profession.
That process on the national scene is in striking contrast
to the way in which local rules are made. In a few districts a
committee of local practitioners is consulted but this is the ex-
ception rather than the rule.2"'
Judge Weinstein adds:
[T]he subject matter of local rulemaking continues to expand
as local judges exercise their fertile imaginations to deal with
perceived problems. . . . Mere publication is probably not
enough. Members of the bar will generally not respond un-
less committees of the bar associations have studied the mat-
ter or the court itself appoints a committee or reaches out to
invite persons who should be interested to attend a public
hearing. The meetings of the circuit conferences have some-
times been used to good effect in this connection. Our experi-
ence in the Eastern District of New York, where most rules
are published before adoption, is that almost no communica-
216. The process has been aptly characterized by Professor Hazard, supra note 215.
217. While it has been argued that rulemaking is an inherent power, Judge Weinstein is
persuasive in arguing that federal rulemaking can no longer be understood otherwise than as
legislative delegation. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 47-48.
218. 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 220.
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tions are received unless pointed questions are put to individ-
uals and associations. In the Northern District of Illinois the
experience has been similar.
219
But is the character of the local rulemaking task similar to that of the
national bodies? Judge Weinstein distinguishes rulemaking from the
normal tasks of a court in this way:
Rule-making by federal courts represents a reversal of
usual adjudicative patterns. In most instances a court acts in
controversies based upon particular facts on a case-by-case
basis, leaving subsequent decisions to synthesize general sub-
stantive and procedural rules. At the level of national federal
rule-making, the Supreme Court lays down general standards
applicable to all future cases without the aid of individual fact
situations and argument. The Court does not have before it
interested parties with a motive for presenting the case fully,
as it does in litigation meeting constitutional justiciability re-
quirements. In rule-making the Court makes legislative pro-
nouncements reviewed by Congress-a departure from the
usual instance where congressional legislation is measured
and interpreted by the courts in the light of constitutional and
other requirements. In normal adjudications the Court's
power is based upon the Constitution, although that power is
limited and proscribed by jurisdiction, venue, and other pro-
visions enacted by Congress. In rule-making the Court's
power is granted by Congress under specific limitations; hav-
ing accepted that grant for many years it is doubtful whether
the Court could claim inherent power were general rule-mak-
ing power circumscribed. Usually a court is concerned with
due process and the opportunity for those concerned to be
heard publicly, whereas in rule-making a court generally acts
in camera without providing an opportunity for argument.
Where the courts utilize a litigation to pronounce broad
general principles and detailed regulations, such as the Mi-
randa rules designed to control police interrogations in a
quasi-legislative manner, the courts are subject to the restric-
tions imposed by judicial tradition. Such cases involved the
concreteness of a litigated matter with specific facts presenting
the issue and with opposing counsel strenuously arguing dif-
ferent points of view. Public argument is normally afforded
219. WEmsmN, supra note 2, at 129-30.
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and briefs by the parties and by amici may be submitted. The
court is obligated to justify its decisions by a reasoned opin-
ion. Moreover, the possibility exists of relatively easy modifi-
cation through future interpretations and legislation, though
change becomes awkward when the decision is justified by
constitutional imperatives2 2 0
If we follow Judge Weinstein and approach local rules as an exer-
cise in legislation using delegated authority, the procedures employed
surely must meet a very high standard. But consider what courts do in
this area. When a court codifies its practice into a rule on supersedeas
bonds like that of Rhode Island,"' the notion of "legislation" is exag-
gerated if it must accommodate this sort of activity. Much local
rulemaking differs from legislation in its source, its scope, and its rele-
vant constituency. Its source is the experience with internal operation
of the court itself, supplemented as appropriate by ideas from lawyers
and other courts. Legislation may draw upon almost any aspect of
human experience, while national rulemaking is less global because of
its exclusive focus on legal procedure. The rulemakers may consider
basic policy choices informed by relevant experience. The scope of lo-
cal rulemaking is further limited to matters or procedures not pre-
empted by national rules, and to lawyers and litigants before a single
court. Local rules also differ from legislation in that the practical con-
stituency cannot be broader than the active bar of one court. While
clients, foreign lawyers and non-litigants may be affected, it is impracti-
cal to attempt to canvass their views, because these people will largely
be represented through the influence of lawyers in the district. No one
else has a sustained interest.
Sometimes courts do more than codify practice when they write
rules. They consider alternative policies, choose one, and then codify it
in a rule. Much of this might be characterized as a rather mundane
sort of managerial policy making, not legislation. When judges discuss
rules involving pretrial procedures, for example, it is in the context of
considering alternative policies for running their courts. Wise consid-
eration of these alternatives often requires consultation because so
many policies involve the activity of lawyers.222 A wise manager in any
organization will solicit views of all participants before embarking on a
major policy change, so also a court must understand the consequences
220. Id at 4-6 (footnotes omitted).
221. See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
222. In matters like pretrial procedure, lawyers' work is an integral part of the court's
work. See note 29 supra.
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of present and proposed policies. Such action has a narrower scope of
applicability than almost any legislation, however. If we take literally
the principle that lawyers are officers of the court, these local rules ap-
pear to be matters of internal operations only. In the degree that a
proper rule goes beyond these "officers" to their clients, it normally has
the effect only of codifying what would have occurred without the rule.
What are the usual procedures for adopting a local rule? A very
limited survey indicates that Weinstein, Wright and Miller and other
critics may be wrong in their characterization of the process. Nearly all
clerks contacted in a telephone survey conducted in the spring of 1979
reported that regular bar consultation is usual.223 In at least three re-
cent instances, bar committees have undertaken drafting of a complete
revision of local rules.224 Many courts work closely with bar associa-
tion groups."2 On the other hand, bar participation was very limited
in an extensive revision of the local rules in the Southern District of
New York.226
It appears that the critics have overdrawn the attack on local
rulemaking procedures, just as the attack on the rules' substance has
223. Thirteen districts were contacted by Barry Groce through telephone calls to the
clerks of the respective courts. Districts surveyed were N.D. Cal., D. Conn., D.D.C., S.D.
Fla., N.D. Ga., N.D. Ill., E.D. La., E.D. Mich., M.D.N.C., D. Ore., W.D. Tex., W.D. Wash.,
and N.D. W. Va. The author summarized his conclusions as follows:
All districts surveyed maintained some form of bench/bar interaction with
respect to the drafting of local rules. Several districts consulted with a special bar
committee, while others maintained informal communication with bar mem-
bers.... Still other districts sought bar input only for major rule changes, keep-
ing "house keeping" matters to themselves.
About one-half of the districts surveyed utilized bar participation in drafting
their local rules. In one district, (N.D. Cal.) a local bar committee was presented
with old local rules and asked to submit a revised version. Other districts use
members of the bar on the court's rule drafting committee.
Few districts held formal hearings or published their proposed rules prior to
adoption. In some instances meetings between the court and members of the bar
were used. Only one district (N.D. Cal.) published all of its proposed rules prior to
adoption. Another (N.D. Ill.) published only "major revisions." Others did not
publish rules but made an effort to circulate a draft of the rules to select members
of the bar.
In all districts having more than a handful of judges there was a special com-
mittee set up to consider local rules. Some committees are made up exclusively of
judges, while others are composed of both judges and bar members.
B. Groce, Reforming Local Rules of the United States District Courts (May 24, 1979) (un-
published paper at University of California, Berkeley).
224. See note 5 supra.
225. See, e.g., the outstanding work of the Committee on Federal Courts, New York City
Bar Ass'n, on use of magistrates, implementation of the Speedy Trial Act, and other matters
of management of the federal courts in New York City. See 33 Rnc. N.Y. BAR ASS'N 212,
510 (1978).
226. The revision was conducted in October, 1980.
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been overdrawn. No one is yet in a position to say precisely how much
public or expert involvement is typical. Presumably, many courts em-
ploy more elaborate procedures for a general revision of their rules, or
for a change they regard as important, than for a single, technical mod-
ification. If we consider together all revisions of any rule, no matter
how minor, Judge Weinstein may be overly broad in his observation
that "[]ack of public debate and publication of local rules before adop-
tion is typical,"' 2 7 although this no doubt is true of a slight majority of
all revisions. Nothing in the Knox Report or elsewhere in the early
history of rule 83 requires that more than "a majority of judges" par-
ticipate in local rulemaking. Evidently, however, we live in an age of
increased demand for broad participation in decisions of public and
private bodies.228 Clearly, participation by experienced practioners
and by scholars can be valuable in major revisions.229 When a court is
codifying what it is already doing, however, perhaps there is little need
for any participants other than judges.
IV. THE SCOPE AND USE OF LOCAL RULES
One of the barriers to understanding the place of local rules in the
structure of governance of the judiciary is the difficulty in obtaining a
grasp on the present scope of the enterprise. The local civil rules total
about one and one-half million words in two large loose-leaf
volumes.230 There are at least six rules or statutes that require courts to
promulgate local rules231 and four more contain suggestions. 232 In ad-
227. WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 129. In notes 460, 461, and 462, Judge Weinstein indi-
cates that he relies heavily on some speculations I advanced in 1976 at his request, in draw-
ing a dark picture of the process. I had no special knowledge of local rule procedures at the
time of the correspondence quoted.
228. This is true for some excellent reasons in the specific context of rulemaking. See
Wheeler, Broadening Participation in the Courts Through Rule-Making and Administration,
62 JUDICATURE 280 (1979).
229. See 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 220.
230. The Callaghan service does not include specialized rules dealing solely with crimi-
nal, bankruptcy, or admiralty matters.
231. 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1976) ("The business of a court having more than one judge shall
be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court."); 28 U.S.C.
§ 139 (1976) ("times [and places for court sessions] shall be determined by the rules or orders
of the court."); 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(4) (1976) ("Each district court shall establish rules pursu-
ant to which the magistrates shall discharge their duties."); 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976) ("In all
courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or
by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct
causes therein."); FED. R. Civ. P. 40 ("The district courts shall provide by rule for the plac-
ing of actions upon the trial calendar. . . ."); FED. R. Civ. P. 78 ("Unless local conditions
make it impracticable, each district court shall establish regular times and places. . . at
which motions requiring notice and hearing may be heard and disposed of. .. ").
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(c) (1976) ("Each district court by rule or standing order may re-
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dition, there have been many proposals and recommendations for local
rules from national bodies, usually the Judicial Conference of the
United States and its staff agency, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, as well as the Federal Judicial Center, the Ameri-
can Bar Association and other bodies.233 Responding to these initia-
tives and to their own predilections, some courts have many rules, some
have few. In a recent speech on local rules, Professor Arthur R. Miller
said, "[i]sn't it startling that in 1978-forty years after the federal rules
took effect ...forty years into the game, nobody knows what the
shape of the ball is?"
2 34
This section will summarize the general scope of local rules, 235 and
may provide a sense of "the shape of the ball" not previously available.
1. Information
One group of local rules simply provides mundane information for
lawyers about how, where, and when the court operates. Numerous
rules describe the case assignment system.236 Other local rules inform
quire advance payment of fees."); FED. R. Civ. P. 16 ("The court in its discretion may
establish by rule a pre-trial calendar .. "); FED. R. Civ. P. 66 ("The practice in the ad-
ministration of estates by receivers or by other similar officers appointed by the court shall
be in accordance with the practice heretofore followed in the courts of the United States or
as provided in rules promulgated by the district courts."); FED. R. Civ. P. 77(c) (court may
provide by local rule for extended hours for the clerk's office).
233. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 490, for a "curious example of 'national' local
rules": a model local rule on black lung cases proposed to all United States District Judges
by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, March 1, 1976. See
text accompanying notes 274-79 infra, for additional examples.
234. Conference on Rule Making, supra note 5, at 494.
235. A "census" of all the local rules is beyond the scope of this article. Rather, certain
key rules on particular topics will be the focus of discussion in combination with the lists of
rules on particular topics that appear throughout this article. Local rules encompass such
topics as: attorneys, divisions within a district, calendars, motions, pleadings, notification of
a claim of unconstitutionality, orders grantable by the clerk, bonds, depositions, discovery,
pretrial procedure, stipulations, continuances, dismissal for want of prosecutions, trial proce-
dure, impartial medical examinations and testimony, exhibits, records and files, juries, costs,
fees, motions for new trials, appeals, bankruptcy and receivership, and habeas corpus.
These topics are discussed in Local Rules Survey, supra note 12. See also Appendix B, infra,
which contains the system of numbering proposed for uniform adoption in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.
236. Several new rules have been promulgated in this once-dormant area since the con-
troversy following assignment of the Chicago Seven trial to Judge Julius Hoffman. As a
result of the court's random assignment procedure, the case was assigned to a judge who was
obviously unsympathetic to the defendants' political beliefs and who was widely attacked as
being biased against the defendants. Northern District of Illinois Rule 2.22 contains a com-
plete description of the "Procedures for Filing and Assigning Cases." Rules 2.30 and 2.31
are similarly comprehensive regarding reassignments and related cases. Cf. E.D. Wis. R.
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lawyers about where to file suits and papers,21 7 detail the hours and
operation of the various clerk's offices in the district, provide regula-
tions that govern access to files and exhibits, or establish a "Motions
$"238Day, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. Other lo-
cal rules assure a flow of substantive and procedural information in the
other direction. Substantively, they require lawyers to notify the court
when they intend to claim that a statute is unconstitutional.239 Proce-
durally, they require lawyers to submit the name of a resident attorney
upon whom papers may be served.240
2. Management
Local rules also play a vital role in the courts' efforts to manage
themselves and their dockets.24' The rules reflect a diverse policy and
practice, which is, in substantial degree, both inevitable and desira-
ble.242 Some diversity is inevitable because state, district, and county
boundaries are more important in the practice of law than in any other
modern profession. The bar is organized by jurisdictions, and a law-
yer's work is specific to a jurisdiction in a degree unheard of in profes-
sions such as medicine or engineering. Federal judges, for the most
part, are products of the locations they serve.243 Diversity is a necessity
4.0 1, which describes a less desirable system that randomly assigns cases to judges in a fixed
sequence. This type of system is open to manipulation.
237. In a geographically large district this information may not be available otherwise.
See note 27 supra.
238. See JUDICIAL CONTROLS, supra note 66, at ch. I.
239. This type of rule is praised in Local Rules Survey, supra note 12, at 1034-37. These
rules enable the court to notify the Attorney General when an act of Congress is challenged
and the United States is not a party, as required in FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. §
2403 (1976). Examples of such rules may be found in: D. ARIz. R. 35; E.D. & W.D. ARK.
R. 18; E.D. CAL. R. 16; N.D. CAL. R. 8; D. COLO. R. 13; D. DEL. R. 21; S.D. FLA. R. 9; N.D.
FLA. R. 6; E.D. ILL. R. 8; N.D. ILL. R. 22; S.D. ILL. R. 6; N.D. IND. R. 20; S.D. IND. R. 16;
S.D. & N.D. IOWA R. 21; D. KAN. R. 12; M.D. LA. R. 11; W.D. R. 21; D. MASS. R. 23; D.
NEB. R. 36; D.N.H. R. 22; D.N.J. R. 32; N.D.N.Y. R. 34; S.D.N.Y. R. 24; W.D.N.Y. R. 9;
M.D.N.C. Civ. R. 20; D. ORE. Civ. R. 14; E.D. PA. R. 20; W.D. PA. R. 11; D.R.I. R. 27; E.D.
WASH. R. 4; N.D. W. VA. Civ. R. 2.14; S.D. W. VA. CiV. PRO. R. 2.10; W.D. Wis. R. 11.
240. Rules requiring designation of local counsel upon whom papers may be served in-
clude: W.D. Ky. R. 4c; W.D. LA. R. 4; D.N.J. R. 5; W.D. OHIO Civ. R. 2.03; W.D. TEx. R.
4.
The above provisions specifically deal with designation of resident counsel; these re-
quirements may also be found in rules relating to admission to the bar: D. DEL. R. 4d; S.D.
FLA. R. 16d; M.D. FLA. R. 2.02; N.D. GA. R. 71.41; N.D. & S.D. IowA R. 5f; D. KAN. R. 4f;
M.D. LA. R. le; D. ME. R. 3dl; D. Minn. R. ld; D. NEB. R. 5q; D.N.H. R. 5b; E.D.N.C. R.
le; M.D.N.C. R. 2d; D.N,D. R. IID(2); N.D. OKLA. R. 5h; W.D. OKLA. R. 4h.
241. See, e.g., CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 30.
242. See Flanders, In Praise, supra note 12, at 32-33.
243. See H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1972).
LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
in federal courts so that they can respond not only to local expectations
and practice but also to specific institutional demands. As one com-
mentator stated:
Because courts must respond to the environment in which
they operate, they must remain flexible. Courts must be able
to adjust to changes in case flow, particularly at the trial court
level. The trial court is at the hub of a wheel which intersects
with prosecutors' offices, private attorneys, litigants, juries,
witnesses, lay groups, city and county governments .... 244
Local rules are one of the main tools employed, though perhaps some
alternatives might serve. When federal judges discuss procedural
problems, the solutions suggested are very often formulated as sugges-
tions to try specific local rules.245
Most controversial are the local rules that touch upon important
provisions in the national rules. One prominent scholar has said that
national rule 23 "really must be thought of as a procedural skeleton
requiring fleshing out by judges and lawyers . *"246 One way this
has been achieved is through rulemaking in narrow areas, filling in the
gaps in the national rules or providing a consistent interpretation to
provisions found there. For instance, several districts have declared
that five days will be considered "reasonable notice" for oral deposi-
tions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a).247 Oddly, the au-
thors of the Columbia Note find this a reasonable bit of guidance,
while criticizing this sort of interpretative rulemaking in other areas.248
Also, the Knox Report and the authors of the Columbia Note find no
objection to local rules setting requirements for the posting of security
for costs:249 "the natural response of the district courts to repeated mo-
244. Saari, Modern Court Management Trends in Court Organization Concepts-1976, 2
JusT. Sys. J. 19, 23 (1976).
245. As an illustration, fourteen specific suggestions for local rules appear in the original
reprint of seminars for newly appointed United States District Judges, 1970-71. SEMINARS,
supra note 6. Criticizing the legalistic approach judges sometimes take to administrative
problems, one distinguished court administrator has said in a private conversation with the
author that judges believe all that is necessary to solve a problem is to pass a rule; the
problem, they think, will go away without any further effort. An alternative to local rules
for disseminating administrative policy might be a published pamphlet of "internal operat-
ing procedures" separate from local rules.
246. Miller, supra note 164, at 677.
247. Notice periods vary under the local rules: D. KAN. R. 17b (5 days); M.D. FLA. R.
3.02 (10 days); D. COLO. R. 5a (5 days); D.N.M. R. 8a (10 days); W.D. & E.D. OKLA. R. 14
(3 days); N.D. OKL.A. R. 15 (3 days); E.D. VA. R. 21g (7 days).
248. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1262.
249. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1267; Knox Report, supra note 167, at 49-50. Some
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tions for security for costs was to pass local rules on the subject. 25 °
Several courts have rules that provide for an assessment of juror
and other costs, when a settlement occurs shortly before trial. In Marti-
nez v. Thrity,251 a rule was upheld that assessed jury costs equally be-
tween parties unless the court was notified of the pretrial settlement
before noon on the last working day before trial. Several courts have
comparable provisions.252 Last minute settlements inconvenience ju-
rors who are called unnecessarily, and they waste valuable trial time
because it is often impossible to schedule another trial soon enough to
fill the time suddenly made available.253 No strategic advantage will be
gained from waiting for serious settlement negotiations until the last
minute before trial that cannot be gained by waiting for a deadline
imposed by local rules.
Less commendable are the local rules that create new "divisions"
within a district. Congress has partitioned thirty-four of the ninety-five
judicial districts into divisions. In all, 208 divisions are created by stat-
ute, and an additional forty-six have been created by local rule.254
There is no discernible logic to either group of provisions, nor to the
additional statutory provisions establishing places where court shall be
held. Some large states, such as California and New York, have no
statutory divisions and few statutory places where court is to be held,
while some much smaller states have many of both.255 District court
local rules have not improved matters; they have disappointed the ear-
nest hope of one commentator who recommended local rules rather
than legislation because "the local courts are in a better position than
Congress to determine the most equitable division of jurisdictional
units for venue purposes. 256
districts require security bonds for non-residents, while others require bonds from poor per-
sons.
250. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1267; Knox Report, supra note 167, at 49-50.
251. 593 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1979).
252. E.g., D.N.M. R. 13e; D. COLO. R. 11; N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 11; W.D. LA. R. 5g; W.D.
TENN. R. 6b; E.D. VA. R. 20c.
253. See CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 30, at 52-53; SEMINARS, supra note 6, at 139-40
(remarks of Judge Alvin B. Rubin); Judge Rubin, The Managed Calendar, 4 JusT. SYS. J.
135, 144-45 (1978).
254. See Appendix A infra.
255. California, with its large population and area, has no statutory divisions and a total
of only six places where court is regularly held in its four districts. Two additional divisions
have been added by local rule. See Appendix A infra. The four districts of New York have
no divisions of either variety and nine places where court is regularly held. By contrast, the
three Alabama districts are divided into twelve statutory divisions, each with at least one
active court location. The two Iowa districts have ten statutory divisions.
256. Local Rules Survey, supra note 12, at 1023.
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Actually these local rules have clouded the application of venue
statutes, 257 with little corresponding rationalization for the judiciary's
257. Venue in civil cases is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1393, and 1404. The effect of
sections 1393 and 1404 becomes lost if local rule divisions are equivalent in effect to statu-
tory divisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1393 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, any civil action, not of a local nature,
against a single defendant in a district containing more than one division must be
brought in the division where he resides.
(b) Any such action against defendants residing in different divisions of the
same district or different districts of the same State may be brought in any of such
divisions.
(emphasis added). 28 U.S.C. § 1404 provides in relevant part:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought.
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action. . . of a
civil nature. . . may be transferred, in the discretion of the court, from the division
in which pending to any other division in the same district.
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place within
the division in which it is pending.
(emphasis added).
Local rules that subdivide statutory divisions, e.g., E.D. MICH. R. II and W.D. MICH.
R. 2, alter the meaning of the venue statutes in four ways. First, under section 1393(a), the
creation of more and therefore smaller divisions restricts the area in which non-local actions
against a single defendant must be brought. Second, under section 1404(a), the creation of
additional divisions limits the places where actions "might have been brought," thus nar-
rowing the court's choice of locations for transfer. Third, under section 1404(b), the subdivi-
sion of statutory divisions adds a requirement that all parties agree to a transfer which,
under the larger statutory divisions alone, would otherwise have been an unconditional
right. Fourth, under section 1404(c), the creation of smaller divisions limits a court's choice
of places at which a pending action may be tried.
Local rules that create divisions in districts undivided by statute, e.g., E.D.N.C. R. 2B,
M.D.N.C. R. 3(b), E.D. VA. R. 3(B), N.D. FLA. R. 2; M.D. FLA. R. 1.02(b), D. AMz. R. 1,
N.D. CAL. R. 105, E.D. CAL.,R. 6, D. MONT. R. 2, D. NEV. R. 1, and E.D. WASH. R. 16(c),
alter the meaning of the civil venue statutes in three ways. First, legislatively undivided
districts are brought within the ambit of section 1393(a). Second, under section 1404(a),
district courts must find that three criteria are met before making a transfer that would
otherwise have been left solely to their discretion. Third, undivided districts are unnecessa-
rily brought within the coverage of section 1404(b).
The only line of cases in which local rule divisions are discussed as they relate to civil
venue statutes deal with District of Montana Rules 2 and 4. In Standish v. Gold Creek
Mining Co., 92 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 765 (1938), the district court
held that it did not have in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who resided in another
locally-created division. On appeal, this ruling was reversed. The court of appeals, divining
a congressional intent that the District of Montana have no divisions, disregarded the local
rule division because it improperly restricted the court's in personam jurisdiction. In a later
case, McNeil Constr. Co. v. Livingston State Bank, 155 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mont. 1957), the
same local rule divisions were held to be "divisions" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), and a transfer of the case from one local division to another was allowed. Living-
ston has been read as limiting the Standish view of local rule divisions to cases where the
court's jurisdiction, not venue, is restricted. See Tassie v. Continental Oil Co., 228 F. Supp.
807 (D. Mont. 1964); Local Rules Survey, supra note 12, at 1023.
Venue in criminal cases is determined by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18,
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geographical coverage. There are extreme differences in the level of
service the federal courts provide in various parts of the country,2 s8 and
creating new divisions has done little to mitigate these effects. If a
court, or the organized bar in a district, wishes to make the judiciary
more accessible in portions of that district, the more promising course
is to lobby in Congress for new statutorily designated places where
court may be held if necessary, and such resources as a building and-
which reflects the sixth amendment's requirement that criminal defendants be tried by an
impartial jury of the district in which the offense was committed. Rule 18 provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall be had in
a district in which the offense was committed. The court shall fix the place of trial within the
district with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses." After rule
18 was amended in 1966 to delete a provision that restricted venue to the division in which
the offense was committed, statutory and local rule divisions no longer constituted units of
venue in criminal cases. Bostick v. United States, 400 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1068 (1969). Thus, the transfer of a case from one division to another does
not constitute a change of venue. See United States v. Clark, 416 F.2d 63, 64 (9th Cir. 1969).
Since the constitutional protections that accompany venue rights no longer apply to in-
terdivision transfers, the courts possess wide discretion in making such transfers. United
States v. Partin, 320 F. Supp. 275, 278 (E.D. La. 1970); Houston v. United States, 419 F.2d
30, 33 (5th Cir. 1969). See United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1021 (5th Cir. 1976) (sua
sponte interdivision transfer upheld); United States v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92, 98-99 (6th Cir.
1974) (transfer of federal prosecution for retrial after hung jury did not violate statute
prohibiting new creation of divisions).
Despite the ostensibly small role that district divisions are to play in the area of criminal
venue, local rule divisions indirectly impinge upon the meaning of rule 18. Some local rules,
e.g., N.D. FLA. R. 2(C), M.D. FLA. R. 1.02(e), D. ARiz. R. 1, N.D. CAL. R. 105-2(b), E.D.
VA. R. 3 & 4, and E.D. WASH. R. 16(c), contain provisions that allow interdivision transfer
for good cause, at the court's discretion. Another, D. MoNT. R. 2, explicitly incorporates the
dictates of rule 18. While these rules arguably complement rule 18, others, e.g., E.D. CAL.
R. 6; E.D. MICH. R. II, W.D. MICH. R. 2, D. NEv. R. 1, E.D.N.C. R. 2B, and M.D.N.C. R. 3,
which rigidly specify the divisions where civil and criminal cases are to be tried, defy the
policy of flexibility evidenced by the 1966 amendment of rule 18. Similarly, Middle District
of Tennessee Rule 5, that incorporates the divisions for that district set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 123(b), requires that all criminal cases be tried in the Nashville division, an egregious
departure from rule 18.
It is likely also that local rule divisions complicate the interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3240, which provides in relevant part:
Whenever any new district or division is established. . . prosecutions for of-
fenses committed within such district [or] division. . . shall be commenced andpro-
ceeded with the same as f such new district or division had not been created...
unless the court, upon the application of the defendant, shall order the case to be
removed to the new district or division for trial.
(emphasis added). The obvious question is whether the establishment of new divisions by
local rule activates 18 U.S.C. § 3240. If local rule divisions are "divisions" within the mean-
ing of section 3240, then defendants have a right, conditioned on the court's discretion, to
have their cases removed to newly-created local rule divisions, a result that Congress surely
did not contemplate.
258. See CASE MANAGEMENT, supra note 30, at 10-13, 96-98.
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most significant-one or more resident judges and support staff.2 59
Another questionable body of local rules is that which creates new
burdens. There are many specifications establishing the format of vari-
ous documents or requiring that a form be used that is not otherwise
required either by rule or by any national body.260 The existence of
these requirements is irritating to commentators and probably to for-
eign lawyers. Yet provisions of this kind serve obvious purposes of the
court. If papers for a given purpose are always similar in size and for-
mat, the work of the court and staff can be expedited. Court rules that
specify the format of documents to be filed are a routine part of the
landscape for any litigating lawyer.261 Most lawyers seem to strongly
dislike conflicting requirements and would prefer a single set of re-
quirements, but do not object to requirements per se.262 Presumably,
however, a chief purpose of the federal rules was to do away with de-
tailed and precise pleadings and other requirements. 26
3
As an aspect of the management function, local rules can be a
powerful tool for rationalizing diverse court practices and imposing
uniformity. A local rule that defines a single method and approach,
and is implemented as written, performs a great service to lawyers. The
greatest difficulty for the practitioner arises when no effective rule ex-
ists. In 1977 the Federal Court Committee of the Bar Association of
259. Without a resident judge, facilities, and support staff, local "boosters" may well find
that no court sessions are held in the city desired. Under 28 U.S.C. § 140, a court may
adjourn any session "for insufficient business or other good cause." Many statutorily estab-
lished places have not held regular sessions for years.
Changes are frequent in the geographical coverage defined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131. For
example, statutory divisions were recently eliminated in the district courts of the Western
District of Louisiana, (Federal District Court Organization Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-408,
§ 3, 92 Stat. 883 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 98(c) (1976))), and Maine (Judicial Districts, Pub. L.
No. 95-573, § 2, 92 Stat. 2458 (1978) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 99 (1978))). The districts in
Illinois were reorganized and renamed (Federal District Court Organization Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-408, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 884 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 93 (1976))), and the divisions
in North Dakota were reorganized (Federal District Court Organization Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-408, § 3(b), 92 Stat. 883 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 114 (1976))). Numerous minor ad-
justments were made in district boundaries and places for holding court in New York. See,
e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-271, 92 Stat. 221 (1978) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 112(c) (1976)); Pub. L.
No. 95-408, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 885 (1978) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1976)); Pub. L. No. 95-
573, § 3, 92 Stat. 2458 (1978) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 112(b) (1976)).
260. For example, see Northern District of California Rule 200-3 to -9; 230-1 to -3. The
fact that these rules resulted from a revision in which new rules were proposed by a bar
committee suggests no great objection to them by lawyers.
261. See, e.g., Sup. CT. R. 15 & 39.
262. Conferences of the author with lawyers in ten districts surveyed, see note 30, supra,
produced fairly uniform reactions on this point, as did the Ninth Circuit survey. See note 5,
supra.
263. 4 WiGHr & MILLEin, supra note 12, at § 1041; 5 id at §§ 1181-1182, 1202.
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Greater Cleveland assembled materials on the pretrial procedures of
the judges in the Northern District of Ohio, with the intention of pub-
lishing a compilation that would guide lawyers through the various
procedures of each judge at each stage. Unfortunately, the report never
got beyond the stage of a rather confusing draft. The committee felt
that procedures were too fluid and individual for any compilation to be
both useful and current.2 64 Situations such as the above dramatically
demonstrate the need for the court to agree upon a single approach and
sequence of forms, and to publish them.265
3. Improving national rules
Local rules have a great potential for informing the national
rulemaking process. This potential has remained largely untapped.266
The failures of local rules can sometimes be useful indicators that mod-
ification is needed in a national rule. The experience gained with at-
tempts to control class action communications and rules on pretrial
procedures are prime examples. Without local rules there would be
even less documentation of experience than is now available. In the
cases in which a local rule has been attacked, the rule has provided a
visible and definite target for the appeals court to examine in light of
the facts at hand.267 Particularly in pretrial matters, but in other mat-
ters of procedure as well, the absence of a record of policies effectuated
by the trial court can entirely forestall supervision by the appellate
court.
2 6 8
The work of Professor Cohn on discovery exemplifies an approach
that could be widely used. He surveyed rules and procedures outlining
264. Personal conversation with Thomas Brady, Executive Director of the Bar Associa-
tion of Greater Cleveland (June 14, 1979).
265. See Conference on Rule Making, supra note 5, at 501 (observations of Judge Walter
E. Hoffman); id. at 481 (observations of Judge Charles W. Joiner). See also Cohn, supra
note 12.
266. Professor Arthur R. Miller, the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
has repeatedly expressed interest in using the local rules experience for this purpose in per-
sonal conversations with the author, 1979-80. The Supreme Court's decision in Miner v.
Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 651, 663 (1960), was criticized for restricting this fund of experience.
See Comment, Adairalty-Depositions-District Court not Authorized to Make Local Rules
Permitting Depositionsfor Discovery, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 228, 233 (1961). See also note 35
supra.
267. Compare United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1979) (because there was no
local rule, court relied on speculation and hearsay regarding the practice questioned) with
McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976) (language of local rule established prac-
tice in question).
268. As previously noted, appellate review of local rules is difficult and sporadic at best.
See note 22 supra.
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the judiciary's efforts regarding discovery rules and draws lessons for
the national rules.169 Along similar lines, the authors of the Columbia
Note on local rules, although highly critical of these rules, used local
rule experience to identify several problems in the federal rules.270
4. National policy
Local rules have been used to implement national policy. There
are numerous local rules that define the powers of magistrates in a dis-
trict's implementation of the several Magistrate Acts.271 Most of the
rules developed from a series of communications from the Committee
on Administration of the Federal Magistrate System, Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States. For example, after the 1976 revisions to the
Act 72 the committee directed its staff, the Magistrate Division of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to prepare alterna-
tive materials for the courts' use. In March, 1977, the Division sent out
two sets of proposed rules to each district, a "long form" and an alter-
native "short form," and a "jurisdictional checklist" interpreting the
relevant law. Several courts have since incorporated these proposals
into their rules.
We have already seen that other local rules are based on national
models, especially those dealing with the fair trial/free press issue. 73
Some other national models that have been or may be used in local
rules are Federal Judicial Center guidelines on prisoner civil rights
cases, 74 the current discussion of proposals for a national system set-
ting qualifications for admission to federal court bars,275 Model Fed-
eral Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement,276 a model rule for Petition for
Disclosure of Presentence or Probation Records,277 and the several stat-
utory requirements for district court "plans. 278
269. See Cohn, supra note 12. Surveying procedures outside the rules was difficult and
unavoidably incomplete. Professor Cohn relied on a limited survey of individual judges
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center.
270. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1271.
271. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976).
272. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)).
273. See text accompanying notes 176-89 supra.
274. RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1977).
275. See Final Report of the Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice
in the Federal Courts to the Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 19-20, 1979).
276. ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline (Feb. 14, 1978).
277. May 15, 1979.
278. Requirements for district court plans appear in Jury Selection and Service Act, 28
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Statutory plan requirements represent a form of double delega-
tion. In each statute involved, Congress required the district to estab-
lish a plan subject to approval by the circuit judicial council. Several
judicial councils have developed model plans that have served as the
basis for district court plans. Neil Kerwin has shown that the statutory
plan device can be a highly effective way to implement new national
policies.2 7 9 Most of the widely-used local rules discussed throughout
this article do not represent any national policy. They go through an
entirely informal and voluntary process of diffusion through the judici-
ary, from judge to judge and from court to court. In a decentralized
system involving much judicial discretion, there is obvious appeal for
an intermediate device, such as a national proposal of a local rule that
will respond to a widespread problem. But the danger of this approach
is obvious, because it could be used to circumvent the national
rulemaking process, especially the congressional role. Beyond the clear
impropriety of bypassing the one democratic element of a largely un-
democratic system, it seems nearly as clear that multiplication of local
rules is undesirable when a uniform national policy is available.
A national proposal for a local rule should be made only when the
national body can show specific aspects of local practice that are so
diverse that a national policy is impractical or undesirable. Alterna-
tively, sometimes a national proposal of alternative local rules might be
sensible for matters on which a national body is divided. However, it
seems clearly undesirable to perpetuate disagreements within or among
national bodies in the form of conflicting local rules, so the device
should be limited to closely related alternatives that are well within the
existing bounds of judicial discretion.
5. An approach
Is the present broad scope of local rules consistent with the power
to make local rules? Local rules are now used not only as specifically
required by statute or rule but also as a "notice board" for routine in-
formation, a tool of court and docket management, a channel of infor-
mation about court views on matters where it must exercise broad
discretion, an occasional device for filling gaps in the national rules,
and an occasional vehicle for implementing national policies. The
rules have also provided opportunities for courts to hammer out inter-
U.S.C. § 1863 (1976); Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976); Speedy Trial Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3165-3166 (1976).
279. Kerwin, Judicial Implementation of Public Policy. The Courts and Legislationfor the
Judiciary, 16 HARV. J. LEG. 415 (1979).
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nal agreement on common policies, and they are a valuable potential
resource for national rulemakers.
All of these are useful and important purposes, yet the resulting
body of rules is certainly prolix and disorganized, aptly characterized
as "the soft underbelly of federal procedure."2 80 Much can be done to
rationalize the body of rules within their present scope. On the prior
question, there is little authority for the proposition that the present
scope of local rules is too broad.28' It is not clear whether the framers
of rule 83 intended for the local rules to exclude the purposes just out-
lined above. Certainly they hoped to abolish conformity. Certainly
they also intended to abolish existing local rules that were in conflict
with the new rules they had developed. As one would expect, many
districts carried forward massive bodies of local rules from the con-
formity era that made frequent reference to obsolete forms of action.282
When the Knox Committee looked at the rules of each district, its "ex-
amination developed the expected conclusion that numerous local rules
in effect when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became operative,
were in conflict with the provisions of those rules. . . . The continued
existence of those obsolete [local] rules without recession or revision
has caused some uncertainty .. ".. 213 It is in this context that we
should understand the Knox Committee's view that Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were "so comprehensive as to leave very few subjects
that need now be dealt with at all by local rules."28 4 The Committee
had a specific purpose that it successfully discharged. Given the occa-
sional statements of the authors of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
suggesting remaining significant purposes for local rules,285 we need
280. Letter from Charles A. Wright to the Duke Law Journal (Nov. 16, 1965), quoted in
LocalRules Survey, supra note 12, at 1012 n.6 and 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at
218.
281. Except, of course, the many commentaries of the last fifteen years cited throughout
this article that have looked at local rules with a jaundiced eye.
282. On September 15, 1938, the District Court of Oregon simply reissued its former
rules, with a notation that any that might be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were of no effect. The old rules had been adopted March 1, 1913, with amend-
ments in 1936 and 1937. The Southern District Court of New York, on the other hand,
appointed a bar committee that rewrote the local rules. Pre-1938 local rules were often
voluminous and full of references to state procedure and to demurrers and other pleadings
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have eliminated.
283. Knox Report, supra note 167, at 10.
284. Id at 9.
285. Dean Charles Clark said, for example: "But one of the problems to be faced is the
wide diversity of conditions existing in different parts of the country and rules must be ad-
justed to accommodate themselves to that diversity." Clark, A Striking Feature of the Pro-
posed New Rules, Change in Basic Attitude Towards Improved Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 787,
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not attach a larger significance to the work of this successor committee.
We can, rather, respond in two ways: by recognizing that local rules
could be expected to proliferate in the increasingly complex litigative
environment since 1940, and by searching for ways to simplify and or-
der local rules without restricting their present use in support of the
important purposes just outlined.
V. AN AGENDA
The agenda of the local rules critics is fairly straightforward, and
follows clearly from their finding that the courts have usurped a quasi-
legislative power never assigned to them. The corresponding remedy
must be to restrict that power, control its exercise through external su-
pervision, and reform rulemaking procedures. The agenda to draw
here must be more complex and less focused, because my main conclu-
sion thus far is that the criticisms are wrong. What follows is incom-
plete. Some policy conclusions seem clear, but many questions remain
unresolved.
The Knox Committee suggested removing "unimportant minu-
tiae" from local rules.2"6 Clearly enough, purely internal matters that
no practitioner needs to know should be excised entirely. A more diffi-
cult question concerns what should be done with provisions that are
"notice board" matters. Surely not everything that is worth publicly
establishing as a matter of policy is worth enforcing as a rule.287 A
threshold problem for reform efforts is the desirability of placing purely
informational matters in a separate forum. The common model in dis-
trict courts is to use "General Orders" for this purpose, a practice fairly
widespread in the Ninth Circuit and recommended by the Knox Re-
789 (1936). Clark went on to oppose suggestions that local practice be incorporated into the
rules, so he left open considerable scope for local variation.
Major Tolman expected that the first sentence of rule 83 (the local rule provision)
would be sparingly used: "There should be very few instances where rules of this character
are needed, since the general rules cover the ground pretty thoroughly." However, his corre-
sponding reference to the final sentence ("one of the most important and salutary in the
entire set of rules") is extremely limiting: "It [the last sentence] permits judges to decide the
unusual or minor procedural problems.... ." ABA INSTITUTE (Wash. D.C.), supra note 4.
It appears we must surprise Major Tolman by expanding the scope of either the first sen-
tence or the final one. To have important matters involving judicial discretion undefined
and left to be adjudicated under the final sentence, is at least as inconsistent with his analysis
of the rule as is the expansion of local rules the Columbia Note authors criticized. See also
notes 170 & 171 supra.
286. Knox Report, supra note 167, at 12.
287. Local rules have the force of law. See 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 223-
19811
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LW REVIEW
port.288 Arguably, a distinction that isolates informational matters
might improve local rules practice. Local rules could be shortened and
their purposes made clearer. The quasi-legislative cast now given to
purely descriptive provisions could be abandoned and reserved to mat-
ters such as class action communications that deserve a more full and
considered treatment before a local rule is adopted. Perhaps most im-
portant, it would be easier for a court to insist that the remaining local
rules be uniformly enforced and followed.
But who is to define the distinction between local rule material and
"General Order" material? Both deal exclusively with procedure, so
no guide can be found in distinctions between substance and procedure
in other contexts. Perhaps it is necessary to distinguish "substantive
procedure" suitable for local rules from "procedural procedure" appro-
priate for the notice board. Even if such a distinction could be made in
principle, its implementation in ninety-five districts probably would not
be consistent and lawyers would confront the problematic task of
searching two sets of materials for a court's policy on any point not
clearly assignable to one or the other.
Finally, how would the "notice board" materials be collected and
distributed? The "General Orders" of the Central District of Califor-
nia are collected in two large loose-leaf volumes in the Clerk's Office
and, one must assume, in the offices of law firms in Los Angeles and a
few other places. There is no national collection. A better solution
would be to follow the lead of the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals and publish "Internal Operating Procedures" covering all in-
formational matters, but even this might lead to confusion. In the final
analysis, the bar will be best served if all courtwide procedures an-
nounced in a form intended for circulation among lawyers are called
local rules and are printed together. While this procedure creates con-
fusion by treating different provisions similarly, there may be no less
effective alternative.
Assuming that a single and heterogeneous body of local rules is to
be compiled, how and how much should they be reformed? Consider
the following suggestions:
1. A court's review of its local rules should be continuous and ag-
gressive. Apart from new policy initiatives a court may consider, a
court should assure that someone, le. the clerk, a bar committee, or a
bench committee, has a continuing responsibility to keep the local rules
current, assure that the rules are lawful, and that they reflect an ade-
288. Knox Report, supra note 167, at 20.
[Vol. 14
LOCAL RULES IN FEDERAL COURTS
quate technical level of draftsmanship. Obsolete provisions and con-
fusing, unlawful, or misleading provisions must be eliminated.
2. Courts should make maximum use of local rulesfor management
and informationalpurposes. There should be a local rule on every pro-
cedural matter lawyers need to know about on which a common policy
exists.389 Where judges' policies conflict, a court should try to develop
a common policy that can be embodied in a rule. Where a rule is or
becomes ineffective, it should be made effective or withdrawn.
3. Courts should involve the bar and sometimes the public in
rulemaking. Bar committees can clearly be useful in identifying flaws
in existing rules and unanticipated burdens or difficulties in proposed
rules. These committees can aid in criticizing and helping to modify
underlying court policies that affect lawyers and clients. While consul-
tation should be maximized, a formal notice and comment procedure
may not be necessary for every rule change. Procedures providing no-
tice and opportunity for comment should be published and invoked
whenever a major rule is considered or a wholesale revision is under-
taken.29° Individual lawyers should be specifically asked to contribute
detailed analysis and criticism.
4. Courts should be especialy meticulous in avoiding local rules
that reverse an existing burden or presumption. Several questionable lo-
cal rules, that otherwise only define a court's usual practice, are suspect
on this ground. Specifically, these rules deal with subjects such as nu-
merical limits on interrogatories and requirements for payment for dis-
tant depositions. A court that expands its local rules could easily create
new rules with this fault and, therefore, should be aware of the danger.
5. The judiciary, at every level, should try to achieve maximum uni-
formity consistent with the informationalfunction of national and local
rules. Circuit-wide local rules, as proposed, for example, in the Ninth
Circuit, are certainly desirable if adequate agreement can be obtained
by all adopting courts and it is clear that the matters in question cannot
or will not be adopted nationally. A nationwide uniform numbering
system would simplify the task of finding relevant provisions.
6. The national rules advisory committees should review local rules
289. Carrying this notion a step further, assuming a presumption against expanding the
national rules exists, then perhaps local rules should be as exempt from any corresponding
presumption. In that case, local rules are the natural vehicle for informational hiatters in
general, assuming that they meet the other standards defined below.
290. An authoritative recommendation to this effect was recently made to the courts of
appeals. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 44-46 (June,
1975).
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in a continuous effort to memorialize as national policy, the policies of
individual courts that enjoy general acceptance. It seems clear that a
vigorous national effort to define and remove from local rules each sig-
nificant new consensus on procedure will greatly aid the effort to ra-
tionalize rules and policies at every level.
7. Rule 83 should be considered for amendment to encourage or
require courts to enforce court-wide application of local rules, and to en-
courage broad consultation before a rule is promulgated or amended.
Rule 83 sets up the rulemaking process that makes a district court very
much like a legislature. A current majority can pass a rule that is bind-
ing both on the minority who oppose it and on all future appointees.
This provision imposes a management burden on a district court that is
more apparent than its counterpart in a legislature, whose members are
not directly affected by most of their own laws. The district courts have
not been effective in assuring that all judges comply with their local
rules.2 9' On the question of consultation, it seems clear that present
procedures are not widely recognized and may not always be adequate.
An amendment might help to clear the air.292
8. Uses of local rulesfor nationalpolicy should be systematized and
their purposes distinguished from national rulemaking. Local rules
should never be used to avoid scrutiny of rules by Congress. When a
national body wishes to use limited experience with a procedure to in-
form its deliberations, it should determine in advance the information
sought.293
291. Perhaps it would help to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 by adding a
comma at the end of the first sentence, and continuing "provided the court is satisfied that
all judges will enforce and abide by the rules as made or amended by a majority." Alterna-
tively, an amendment might require more than a majority for making or amending local
rules. A final possibility would be to include language in rule 83 to make explicit a present
and future responsibility of each district court to monitor compliance and take action if
compliance is not obtained.
292. A new second sentence might be inserted into Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 as
follows: "Promulgation shall follow appropriate notice and consultation with the bar and
other interested groups."
293. Possible new langage to add at the end of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83:
From time to time the Judicial Conference of the United States may propose
local rules for possible adoption by district courts. If it wishes to consider the pos-
sibility of future amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through a
version of the proposed local rule, it shall specify the information desired to be
obtained and the fashion in which that information will bear on adoption or non-
adoption of the amendment to the federal rules.
The Judicial Conference shall not propose local rules in the expectation of
universal adoption.
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VI. SOME UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
While this agenda may propose a good deal of new activity, it
forecloses little and leaves some questions open. Where is the best
boundary between national and local rules? One answer might be that
the national rules should incorporate all procedural matters on which
national agreement can be obtained. This extreme measure might
greatly expand the national rules, violating the principles of "simplic-
ity, scarcity and economy" that have served well.294 The rules might
eventually include precise specification of paper size, format, and se-
quence of topics in various pleadings, for example. Or should the rules
be rigorously limited to their original topics?2 95 This would likely be a
prescription for steadily expanding differences among districts. A suit-
able middle ground is elusive.
Another open question is the possibility of a review body for local
rules. This body might include the existing advisory committees on
rules, the circuit Judicial Councils, or the Federal Judicial Center.2 96
The drawbacks are clear in each case; yet pressure for review could
necessitate some new formal mechanisms. If the courts do not reform
their own rules, as suggested above, some form of review will become
increasingly desirable.
Finally, there are interesting unresolved questions on the present
and prospective use of local rules to illuminate proposals for national
rules. Do experiments along these lines raise equal protection
problems?2 97 How can the local rules experience be brought to bear on
national proposals in something better than an ad hoc fashion? These
and other questions will hopefully be determined through expanded
experimentation with the local rules process.
294. Columbia Note, supra note 3, at 1252, quoted in 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
12, at 217.
295. This approach would be inconsistent with the expectation of the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure authors. See Knox Report, supra note 167, at 13 & n.5.
296. We have the views of the original advisory committee on the possibility of review by
the courts of appeals only.
There was a discussion in the Committee as to whether the local rules in each
district should be made as a finality by the district judges or whether they should
be subject to approval by the circuit court of appeals of the respective circuits. The
Committee entertained the view that as the district judges are the ones to operate
under the local rules they should have the final determination subject to modifica-
tion by the Supreme Court of the United States if that court desires to change any
local rule so prescribed.
ABA INSTITUTE (Cleveland), supra note 4, at 357 (statement of Hon. George Donworth).
297. These issues are the subject of current work by the Federal Judicial Center's Advi-
sory Committee on Experimentation in the Law.
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Divisions Created by Statute and Local Rule
STATUTORY LOCAL RULE STATUTORY LOCAL RULE
DIVISIONS DIVISIONS DIVISIONS DIVISIONS
LOCAL LOCAL
28 U.S.C. § # RULE # 28 U.S.C. § # RULE 45
FIRST CIRCUIT (But combines divi.
Me. 99 2 sions in criminal
Mass. 101 1 cases).
N.H. 109 1 W.D. Tenn. 123(c) 2
P-L 120 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT
P. 1 1 19 I ,v v ...
SECOND CIRCUIT
Coan. 86
N.D.N.Y. 112(a)
ED.N.Y. 112(c)
S.D.N.Y. 112(b)
W.D.N.Y. 112(d)
Vt. 126
THIRD CIRCUIT
Del. 87
NJ. 110
ED. Pa. 118(a)
M.D. Pa. 118(b)
W.D. Pa. 118(c)
V.I. 48 U.S.C.
§ 1615
FOURTI CIRCUIT
Md. 100
ED.N.C. 113(a)
M.D.N.C. 113(b)
W.D.N.C. 113(c)
S.C. 121
ED. Va. 127(a)
W.D. Va. 127(b)
N.D.W. Va. 129(a)
S.D.W. Va. 129(b)
FIFTH CIRCUIT
N.D. Ala. 81(a)
M.D. Ala. 81(b)
S.D. Ala. 81(c)
N.D. Fla. 89(a)
M.D. Fla. 89(b)
S.D. Fla. 89(c)
N.D. Ga. 90(a)
M.D. Ga. 90(b)
S.D. Ga. 90(c)
E.D. La. 98(a)
M.D. La. 98(b)
W.D. La. 98(c)
N.D. Miss. 104(a)
S.D. Miss. 104(b)
N.D. Tex. 124(a)
ED. Tex. 124(c)
S.D. Tex. 124(b)
W.D. Tex. 124(d)
C.Z. 48 S.A.L.
§ 1122
SIXTH CIRCUIT
ED. Ky. 97(a)
W.D. Ky. 97(b)
ED. Mich. 102(a)
W.D. Mich. 102(b)
N.D. Ohio 115(a)
S.D. Ohio 115(b)
ED. Tern. 123(a)
M.D. Tenn. 123(b)
2
1 Rule 2B 7
1 Rule 3(b) 6
1
10
I
7
3
2
I Rule 2 4
1 Rule 1.02b 5
1
4
7
6
10
1
6
4
5
7
6
6
7,
2 Rule 1 3
2 Rule 2
2
2
4
3 Rule 5 3
S.D. 111.D. Ill.
E.D. 111.
N.D. Ind.
S.D. Ind.
ED. Wis.
W.D. Wis.
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
ED. Ark.
W.D. Ark.
N.D. Iowa
S.D. Iowa
Minn.
ED. Mo.
W.D. Mo.
Neb.
N.D.
N.D.
NINTH CIRCUIT
Alaska
Ariz.
N.D. Cal.
ED. Cal.
C.D. Cal.
S.D. Cal.
Hawaii
Idaho
Mont.
Nev.
Or.
ED. Wash.
W.D. Wash.
Guam 48
N. Mariana
Is. 48§
93(b)
93(c)
94(a)
94(b)
130(a)
130(b)
IIU
81A I
82 1 Rule 1 4
("rTIhe district is
divided into four unof.
ficial divisions.")
(emphasis added).
84(a) I Rule 105 2
84(b) I Rule 6 2
84(c) I
84(d) 1
91 1
92 1
106 1 Rules 2 &
4 5
108 1 Rule 1 2
("For convenience, the
district is divided into
two unarcial dis.
tricts.") (emphasis
added).
117 1
123(a) I Rule 16c 3
28(b) I
.S.C. I
§ 1424
U.S.C.
1694(a)
TENTH CIRCUIT
Colo. 85 I
Kan. 96 1
N.M. III I
N.D. Okla. I16(a) I
FD. Okla. 116(b) I
W.D. Okla. I16(c) I
Utah 125 2
Wyo. 131 1
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
D.C. 88 2
TOTALS 224
TOTAL
DIVISIONS
LOCAL RULES IN FEDERAL COURTS
APPENDIX B
Ninth Circuit Proposed Uniform Local Rules*
I. Organization and Operation of the Court
1-105 Sessions
1-110 Office of the Clerk
1-120 Assignment and Transfer of Cases
1-125 Court Fees
1-130 Files and Records: Exhibits
1-135 Orders Grantable by Clerk
1-140 Official Newspapers
1-145 Conduct in Courtroom: Photography and Recording Devices
1-150 Court Library
1-155 Sanctions
1-160 Procedure for Adopting, Rescinding, and Amending Rules
1-165 Transitional Provision; Effective Date
1-170 Short Title
II. Attorneys
2-105 Attorneys-Appearance and Withdrawal
2-110 Attorneys-Admission to Practice
2-115 Standards of Professional Responsibility
2-120 Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement (Alternative
1)
2-120 Alternative 2
2-125 "Free Press-Fair Trial"
III. Civil Rules
A. Form of Papers Filed; Related Cases; Stipulations
3-105 Format of Papers
3-110 Notice of Related Cases
3-115 Stipulations
B. Proceedings Before Trial
3-205 Service of Process
3-210 Scheduling Conference
3-215 Motions
3-220 Motions Dealing with Depositions and Discovery
3-225 Interrogatories to Parties
3-230 Requests for Productions
3-235 Requests for Admission
* This table is drawn from a preliminary report submitted by Profs. Edward W.
Cleary and Robert L. Misner (Arizona State University, Mar. 2, 1979) to the circuit-wide
committee of the circuit judicial conference.
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
3-240 Notice of Settlement or Other Disposition
3-245 Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute
3-250 Minors and Incompetents
3-255 Security for Costs
3-260 Surety Bonds
3-265 Removal Bond
C. Trial
3-305 Size of Civil Juries
3-310 Jurors-Examination
3-315 Jurors-Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
3-320 Instructions to Juries-Requests and Objections
3-325 Verdicts: Special Verdicts and Interrogatories to Juries
3-330 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
D. Judgments and Proceedings After Trial
3-405 Judgments: Preparation and Objections
3-410 Motions for New Trial and Motion Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict
3-415 Taxation of Costs
E. Special Proceedings and Ancilliary Remedies
3-505 Habeas Corpus and § 2255 Motions
3-510 Receivers Other Than in Bankruptcy
3-515 Naturalization
3-520 Social Security and Black Lung Actions
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